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In this EUI working paper the EUI itself is taken as an object of 
investigation; it has been studied as a place "where nations meet", 
where people construct, affirm and modify ideas and feelings 
about their own and others’ nations through international contacts. 
The paper does not deal with the functioning o f the EUI as an 
organisation, nor with any o f its achievements. Aspects o f the 
organisation are mentioned only in so far as they are immediately 
relevant for the subject-matter with which the paper deals.
The field work for o f this case-study was carried out during my 
stay as Jean Monnet fellow at the European University Institute in 
1986-1987. I wish to thank all those who, in one way or another, 
have contributed to this result. My special appreciations are to 
Dominique Merllie (then a colleague at the EUI), who helped 
with the questionnaire and the analysis of the data; Bart van 
Heerikhuizen and Johan Goudsblom, who commented on an 
earlier draft; and Gale Strom, who corrected my English.
While the case-study itself is a modest, small-scale exploration, the 
problems dealt with are wide-ranging. This working paper is part 
o f a larger, ongoing project. Comments on this part o f the project 
are therefore very welcome.
Nico Wilterdink
























































































































































































Like sex, age, and occupation, the nation a person belongs to seems 
to be o f primary importance for his or her personal identity, at least 
in the Western world o f the present age. To say "I am French", "I am 
American", "I am Danish" indicates more than a geographical place 
o f living or a bundle o f formal rights and obligations with respect to 
a particular state; it refers to a group of people the speaker identifies 
with (or at least is expected to identify with) and is identified with, 
a group whose members share common knowledge, behavioral rules 
and customary ways o f doing things, - in short, a common culture.
These statements sound perhaps more self-evident than they 
actually are. The degree to which a person can be said to belong to 
a certain nation - identifies with it, is identified with it, shares cultural 
traits with other members o f the same nation - varies, as does the 
importance o f this sense o f belonging for one’s personal identity or 
self. Indeed, the existence o f nations itself is a matter o f degree. A 
nation may be said to exist to the degree that people share a distinct 
culture and, in relation to that shared culture, have an identity as 
members o f the same actual or desired political community (i.e. a 
sovereign state). In other words, a nation exists to the degree that its 
(presumed) members have a common national identity, a common 
awareness o f belonging to something called the nation (1).
In recent years the concept o f ’national identity’ has become 
somewhat fashionable among historians and social scientists. In a 




























































































nations as self-contained, more or less autonomous wholes has 
become less self-evident. Theoretical treatises have been written on 
social and cultural processes conducive to the emergence o f nations 
and nationalism (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Smith 1986), and 
historical studies have been devoted to the spread o f national core 
cultures from geographical centres and elite groups to larger masses 
o f the population (Boerner 1986; Weber 1976; Hobsbawm/Ranger 
1983). Hardly any attention has been paid, however, to the question 
o f how ideas and feelings of national identity are related to everyday 
life experiences - how they are rooted in, formed and changed by 
such experiences and how they are shown in everyday life situations.
The present article enters into this question by focusing empirically 
on the case o f one international - European - organisation. It is 
particularly in international settings, in the confrontations between 
people who define each other as ’foreigners’, that ideas and feelings 
of national identity are experienced, tested, and modified.
The organisation which has been taken as a case for study is called 
European University Institute (EUI); it is an institute for higher 
education and research in history, law, economics, and political and 
social sciences, financed by the member states o f the European 
Community (EC), and located in Italy. People from different countries 
- mostly but not exclusively countries of the European Community - 
become members o f this organisation for one to seven or more 
years, having a position o f post-graduate student, professor, 
researcher, or member o f the administrative staff. For most of them 
the interaction experiences with people from other nations are direct, 




























































































situations, but also to "social" situations outside work; since most of 
the Institute’s members are single and fairly young, and do not have 
strong personal relations in the surrounding Italian society, they are 
predominantly oriented toward each other for informal sociability. 
Unlike other international organisations, moreover, the members of 
this organisation do not act as representatives o f their governments; 
their behaviour is in no way formally constrained by their belonging 
to this or that nation. The organisation can be taken therefore as an 
interesting social laboratory, a case "where nations meet" directly and 
intensely and in relatively free and unconstrained ways.
The field stage o f this investigation was conducted in the first half 
o f 1987; it consisted o f 1) participant observation as a member o f the 
organisation, 2) handing out a questionnaire, answered by one- 
hundred respondents, and 3) having long interviews with some senior 
members o f the administrative staff (2). Leading questions in the 
investigation were the following: How important are ideas and 
feelings o f national identity for the members o f this international 
organisation, and what is the nature o f these ideas and feelings? To 
what extent and in what sense are ideas and feelings o f national 
identity modified, strengthened or weakened under the impact of 
experiences in this organisation? To what extent and how are patterns 
o f informal interaction determined by nationality? What ideas do the 
members o f the organisation have about their own and other 
(European) nations, to what extent and in what sense do they make 
generalizing distinctions between members o f different European 
nations, and how are these ideas or images related to experiences 




























































































of the organisation have ideas and feelings o f a common European 
identity, and what is the nature o f these ideas and feelings?
This article will deal with these questions. The empirical results of 
this investigation are sociologically interesting, it is claimed, because 
they have wider significance than this specific case alone; they 
contribute to our insight into the nature o f national identities as real 
life experience. The organisation studied has specific characteristics 
which influence the results: most o f its members are well-educated 
and can be called intellectuals; most o f them come from Western 
European countries, which are not only geographically, but also 
socially and culturally close to each other; the organisation is part of 
the European Community and one o f its official goals is the enhance­
ment o f European cultural integration; and it is located in one o f the 
countries o f the European Community, Italy. These characteristics 
limit the possibilities o f generalisation. At the same time they make 
specific observations and hypotheses possible. The results of this case 
study will be compared with other empirical data, placed in a wider 
framework o f social developments, and interpreted with the help of 
theoretical insights. In my presentation I will shift frequently from 
description o f research data to broader interpretations and 





























































































The importance o f nationality
To begin with: national differences are socially significant in the 
perception o f the members o f this organisation. One o f the first 
things people want to know, and get to know, when meeting for the 
first time, is from what nation they are. Very often people are 
referred to by mentioning their nationality: "the German law 
professor", "these two Dutch girls", "that Italian secretary". Apparently 
nationality is regarded as a basic personal attribute, to which other 
attributes can be connected. It is used as one o f the main criteria for 
classifying people, for ordering the social world.
In conversations between people from different nations very often 
information about their countries is exchanged; this may range from 
the political system to the prices o f consumer goods, from intellectual 
traditions to food habits, from the organisation o f the mass media to 
typical manners and mores.
It is assumed and confirmed in these conversations that members of 
different nations live in different social worlds, to which they are 
related as insiders versus outsiders, experts versus laymen. Members 
and non-members o f a certain nation are differentiated, according to 
this assumption, in their social knowledge, their knowledge o f a 
certain part o f social reality.
The behavorial trait which distinguishes the members o f a given 
nation most clearly is their use o f a specific language. It is the most 
visible - or better, most audible - part of a specific national culture, 




























































































behavioral differentiation of nations immediately apparent and 
undeniable. To be sure, language boundaries and national boundaries 
do not coincide completely, as e.g. the Scots and the Irish also speak 
the language o f the English, and Belgians use either French or Dutch 
as their first language; but for the immediate experience o f national 
differences in this international setting these are relatively minor 
complications.
In other words, when people from different nations communicate, 
their "foreignness" for each other is indicated by the fact that at least 
one o f them cannot use his first language, the language he knows 
best and uses most frequently. In this Institute English is the most- 
often used lingua franca, spoken and understood by almost all 
members to a certain extent; which means that the British, the Irish 
and the Americans differ from the members o f other nations in their 
degree o f control o f English plus their accent. Other languages 
however are also often used as a common second language: French, 
Italian, sometimes German. This means that in many situations several 
language options are open; a Spaniard and an Italian, for example, 
may hesitate between speaking Italian, French, or English with each 
other; likewise, a German and a Dutchman may choose between 
English and German. Complications are even larger when more than 
two people with different first and second-best languages are talking 
(or try to talk) together. The plurality of languages which is a basic 
characteristic of this organisation is a source o f communication 
problems, confusion, misunderstandings, conflicts, and also of 
excitement. In this situation some language virtuosi win prestige by 




























































































quickly and without difficulty from one to another language.
Language is also a much-discussed topic o f conversation, the focus 
o f interest being the relation between language and national identity. 
Language is taken as a basic feature of a nation, while at the same 
time it is recognized that the boundaries o f language and those of 
nation are not identical: this is a source o f intellectual puzzle. From 
it questions arise concerning the language o f such groups as the 
Flemish, the Scots, the Catalans and the people o f Luxemburg, all of 
whom are represented in this organisation. The interest in such 
questions seems to be motivated by the search for cognitive order by 
drawing clear boundaries and at the same time the pleasure in 
recognizing complexities.
In spite o f the keen interest in national differences shown by the 
members o f this organisation many of them are reluctant in expressing 
a strong identification with their own nation. Less than one-fifth 
(19%) o f the respondents to the questionnaire said they fully 
subscribed to the statement "The nation I belong to means a lot to 
me"; the proportions o f those who could subscribe "to a large extent" 
or "somewhat" to the statement were much larger: 31% and 33% 
respectively; while 12% did not subscribe at all. Agreement with the 
less personal statement "My nation is characterized by certain distinct 
traditions" was much stronger: 43% agreed "fully", 36% "to a large 
extent", while only one person did not agree at all. Respondents 
showed much reluctance, on the other hand, toward statements 
expressive o f national pride: only 26% supported "fully" (16%) or "to 




























































































(France, England etc.), while 29% did not subscribe to it at all (37% 
said they subscribed "somewhat"). Interestingly, the respondents 
expressed more feelings o f shame "when compatriots do certain things 
which are frowned upon by foreigners" than feelings of pride "when 
compatriots achieve something which is recognized internationally as 
being important". In short, while the respondents had no difficulty in 
recognizing the distinctiveness o f their own nation, most of them 
showed at least some hesitation in showing feelings o f identification 
with their nation, and even more in showing positive feelings of 
identification such as national pride.
According to surveys national populations in Western Europe show 
on the whole much more national pride than the group investigated 
here. Thus, in a survey held in 1984 in five EC-countries - France, 
the United Kingdom, Italy, the Federal Republic o f Germany, and the 
Netherlands - almost 80% of the respondents in these countries taken 
together (weighted proportions) said they were "very proud" or "quite 
proud" o f their nation; while, as mentioned, only 26% o f the 
respondents o f EUI (and only 21% o f the respondents from these 
same five countries) answered in a similar way (Euro-Barometer 21: 
56-57).
The relatively low level o f national pride shown by the respondents 
can be connected to the norm o f internationalism prevalent in this 
organisation: the norm that one should get along well with people 
irrespective o f their nationality, that one should be open-minded and 
unprejudiced toward people from other nations, and that one should 




























































































respondents criticized members of other nations - e.g. the French or 
the English - as being nationalistic, chauvinistic, parochial, isolationist, 
or xenophobic. Internationalism as a norm or ideal fits with the 
international character o f the organisation: it is not far-fetched to 
assume that in the recruitment of new members there is a selective 
bias in favour o f those who are internationally oriented, and that 
within the organisation - with its official ideology o f European 
integration - social pressures lead to further adjustment to that norm.
There is more to say about this, however. Internationalism also fits 
with the ambitions o f many people in Western Europe today who 
seek to attain high-status positions, whether in science, in business, or 
in the government bureaucracy (and all these three kinds o f ambitions 
could be found among the post-graduate students o f this institute). 
With intensified international interdependencies and communications 
the nation-state has become too small for them. Business 
corporations, banks, law firms, bureaucracies like the EC 
administration, - all offer increasing numbers o f well-paid jobs for 
which knowledge o f foreign languages, international experiences and 
an international orientation are important assets. Moreover, the ideal 
scientific attitude, which is cultivated in this organisation, is one of 
universalism, o f detachment from any narrow group interest (cf. 
Merton 1942; Gouldner 1979); scientists have learned to orient 
themselves to a stock o f knowledge which is not nation-bound, and 
they form bonds o f cooperation and competition which cross-cut 
national borders. This does not mean that scientists cannot be 
nationalistic; "universalism" with respect to their own specialist field 




























































































o f science too international mobility has become more important in 
recent times.
Internationalism appeared in the respondents’ answers to the 
question as to whether they liked or disliked working with people 
from other countries than their own: 84% said they liked it, while 
only one person said he disliked it (the rest said they neither liked 
nor disliked it). Asked for reasons for this preference, they gave 
answers such as "you learn a lot from it", "it broadens your 
perspective", "it widens your cultural horizon", "it is intellectually 
stimulating", is "interesting", "challenging", "makes you more aware of 
your own limitations and prejudices". All these answers can be 
interpreted as typical for "educated" people - the reasons they give 
correspond to what they have learned to be desirable as part o f their 
formal education.
Internationalism as a norm and ideal appeared more indirectly in 
the answers to the question if the respondent had experienced 
specific problems in this institute arising from the fact that people 
from different countries worked together. From observation it could 
be established that such problems abounded, if only because o f the 
plurality o f languages; discussions in seminars, for example, were 
clearly hampered by this fact; and in the administration a language 
struggle was going on between those who preferred French (being the 
dominant language in the EC bureaucracy), those who stuck to Italian 
(the language o f the surrounding society), and those who insisted on 
speaking English. Given these and other problems, which were often 
discussed in informal talks, it is remarkable that more than half o f the 




























































































might be explained as resulting from the tendency to eliminate 
cognitive dissonance between the perception o f such problems and 
the ideal o f smooth and harmonious international cooperation. Those 
who answered that there were such problems often referred to 
language differences (19 times); besides, differences in academic and 
scientific traditions and, more in general, in cultural backgrounds were 
often mentioned. These differences resulted, according to the 
respondents, in misunderstandings and confusion. Only a few 
respondents referred in this context to differences in mentality or 
character.
All in all most respondents showed ambivalence in their attitudes 
toward their own nation. While suggesting on the one hand that their 
national background did not matter much to them, they did not deny 
completely, on the other hand, feelings o f national identification and 
even o f national pride.
The degree to which respondents expressed feelings o f national 
pride varied by nationality. Italians and Irish were fairly proud of 
their country, while Germans and Dutch showed such feelings to a 
very low degree. An intermediate position, near the over-all average, 
was taken by the French and the English, - which contrasts, 
incidently, with the widespread idea among the respondents that the 
French and (to a lesser degree) the English were very nationalistic.
Given the small numbers of respondents from each nation one 
cannot attach much importance to these results. Yet it might be 
interesting to compare them with the results o f the 1984 survey 




























































































United Kingdom, Italy, Western Germany and the Netherlands. In 
this survey the British expressed the strongest national pride; almost 
half o f them (49.5%) said they were "very proud" o f their country, 
and the large majority o f the rest said they were "quite proud". The 
British were followed by the Italians, the French, and the Dutch, in 
that order; the differences between these three national samples were 
small, however, and each o f them was near the over-all score. By far 
the least national pride was expressed by the Germans; less than one- 
fifth (19%) said they were "very proud" o f their country, 44% said 
they were "quite proud", while 20% chose for "not very proud" and 
10% for "not proud at all" (Euro-Barometer 21: 56-57).
In this relatively low degree o f expressed national pride the 
Germans in the survey and the Germans in our sample are similar. 
This lack o f positive German identity, as some German historians 
would put it, can only be understood in the light o f the German past, 
particularly the period o f National Socialism. To the extent that 
Western Germans share the official standpoint o f their government 
and the major political parties toward that period and acknowledge 
a certain continuity between past and present, they have every reason 
not to be proud o f their country.
Given the way the period of National Socialism is publicly discussed 
in present-day Western Germany (3) and recognized as "our past" 
(and not "their past", as tends to be the case in Eastern Germany and 
Austria (4)), one could have expected even fewer expressions of 
national pride than are found in this and other surveys.
A  relatively low degree o f national pride is also shown by the 




























































































with a widespread intellectual style, an inclination among Dutch 
writers and journalists to emphasize the insignificance o f their own 
country. It also corresponds with the image given in many Dutch 
writings o f the Dutch as being extremely modest about themselves as 
a nation. However, according to the survey the Dutch are not very 
different from other Europeans in their intensity o f national pride. 
The Dutch in our case-study on the other hand indeed express an 
extreme modesty about their own nation. Comparison between these 
two results suggests that the proverbial typically Dutch lack of 
national boastfulness is more an intellectual style than a common 
characteristic o f the Dutch population as a whole.
The most striking dissimilarity between the survey results and our 
data in relation to national differences is the position o f the Italians: 
in our case they are relatively nationalistic, while according to the 
survey they are near the European average. This difference may be 
explained by the fact that the self-selection o f the Italian members of 
EUI is different from that o f the non-Italian members: in the 
recruitment o f the Italians an internationalist orientation probably 
plays a less important role.
Changes and ambivalences in national identity
How do ideas and feelings o f national identity change under the 
impact o f experiences in an international organisation and a foreign 
country? Theoretically we could expect two contrasting types of 




























































































feelings o f national identity, as one becomes more aware of the 
importance of one’s national background and seeks to defend it 
against undermining influences; on the other hand a decreasing 
identification with one’s original nation, as one is influenced by 
members o f another nation (or other nations) and recognizes and 
accepts that influence. Both types o f responses - which can be called 
the "fundamentalist" and the "assimilationist" response, respectively - 
have been found among groups o f immigrants in various societies 
(Reitz 1980).
In the self-report o f the repondents of this case-study both types 
o f responses, too, could be found, with a slightly higher proportion 
of the "fundamentalist" response. Exactly one-quarter o f the 
respondents declared that their feelings o f identification with their 
own country had become stronger since they had come to EUI, while 
21% answered that these feelings had become weaker (the rest did 
not answer the question or said that their feelings o f identification 
had not changed). Much stronger was the tendency to express a 
sharpened awareness o f the specific characteristics of one’s nation: 
42% o f the respondents said that the distinctiveness o f their nation 
seemed more marked to them since they had become members of 
EUI, while only 13% answered to the contrary. In other words, there 
is a clear tendency toward a stronger cognitive recognition o f one’s 
own nation as a distinct sociocultural entity in response to the 
experiences in the international setting, but this does not always go 
together with a stronger emotional identification with one’s nation.




























































































Non-Italian members o f EUI who had worked there for a fairly long 
time often reported a feeling o f growing distance from their original 
country combined with an increasing awareness o f the importance o f 
their national "roots". This appeared in particular in the interviews 
held with some members o f the administrative staff. One o f the 
interviewed, a German librarian, aptly compared it with the changing 
attitude toward childhood: as you grow older, you feel less a child, 
but at the same time you become more aware o f the importance of 
your childhood for your present personality; in the same way - she 
said - the more distance from Germany she felt, the more she became 
aware o f the importance and inevitability o f her Germanness.
National identity is likely to become a vexing problem for those 
who stay long and do not know if and when they will go back to 
their "home country". For them a redefinition o f their group- 
belongingness becomes inevitable. Some o f them identify increas­
ingly with the country they live in - they follow the road of 
"italianization". This is most likely to happen with those who marry 
an Italian man or woman and thus become members o f an Italian 
family (actually I found this option in no other cases). Others feel 
more and more detached from any nation; they clearly and 
consciously distinguish themselves from their Italian environment 
while at the same time feel a growing distance from their country 
o f origin (even though they may remain attached to it to some 
extent). Some o f them tend to idealize Italy - as if they were 
permanent tourists - and criticize their home country from that 
perspective. More common among these long-stayers is however 




























































































about Italian manners, mores, and institutions.
The degree to which the long-stayers defined their situation as 
good or bad, harmonious or problematical, also varied. Those who 
"italianized" present this as a choice with which they were happy; 
they felt proud to behave like real Italians and to be accepted as 
full members in Italian circles. Some o f those who felt distance 
from any nation also presented their situation as a good one; they 
regarded their not-belonging to any particular nation as 
advantageous, as giving them flexibility and freedom. This attitude 
corresponds with the ideal o f internationalism, and could be found 
in particular among some professors and researchers, who defined 
themselves as wandering scholars, detached from any narrow 
national interest. Their main reference group was not a nation, but 
the international community o f scientists or scholars in their field.
Others however - especially some members o f the administrative 
staff - presented their situation as problematic. One o f the 
interviewed, for example, said that she lived in an "artificial world", 
in which she felt confused about where she stood and where she 
belonged to. Negative feelings about this situation o f enforced 
marginality were often expressed indirectly, e.g. in the vehement 
complaints about Italians and Italian society. Such feelings can be 
transmitted to children; thus, the four-year old child o f an 
American divorced secretary invented fantasy stories about a 
dreamland, a country where she and her mother would be happy 




























































































Nation and interaction patterns
To what extent does nationality, or national culture, determine 
interaction preferences and informal interaction patterns? Several 
investigations have shown a clear correlation between interaction 
preferences and patterns on the one hand and cultural similarities 
(indicated by stated opinions and attitudes, education, class origins 
etcetera) on the other hand: the more people are culturally alike, 
the more likely they are to establish relations o f an affective nature 
(see e.g. Baron & Byrne 1984: 226-229). Since such investigations 
have only been carried out within one-nation groupings (as far as I 
know), nationality has not been included among the indicators of 
cultural similarity/dissimilarity; but we may expect that the general 
relation holds true as well if "culture" is specified as "national 
culture", which is indicated by nationality. On this basis the 
following hypotheses about interaction preferences and patterns in 
an international setting may be advanced:
1) Participants in an international setting express a stronger 
preference for interaction with people from their own nation 
than with people from other nations.
2) Participants in an international setting who are members o f a 
given nation express a stronger preference for interaction
with members o f another nation the smaller the cultural 
differences between the two nations are.
3) Participants in an international setting have more informal 
(non-work) contacts with people from their own nation than 




























































































4) Participants in an international setting who are members o f a 
given nation are more likely to have informal (non-work) 
contacts with members o f another nation the smaller the 
cultural differences between the two nations are.
EUI offered a good opportunity to test these hypotheses, not only 
because it is an international organisation, but also because 
disturbing factors often found in such organisations were absent in 
this case: people of the same nationality did not know each other 
before they came to EUI; and the organisational setting as such 
does not require or stimulate in particular cooperation between 
people o f the same nationality. In other words, in so far as 
members o f this organisation exhibited a relatively high frequency 
o f interaction with people o f the same nationality, this could be 
interpreted as a matter of "personal" preference.
The empiral data largely confirm the hypotheses, with the 
exception of the first one:
1) The respondents did not express a clear preference for informal 
contacts and friendly relations with co-members of the organisa­
tion who were from the same nation. A  large minority (37%) 
denied having any preference at all for "people from a certain 
country or countries" in their "informal (non-work) contacts and 
friendly relations with people related to the Institute". Among 
those who said they had such a preference (59%), a large majority 
defined that preference as "moderate" (49%) rather than "strong" 




























































































basis o f random choice expressed a preference for informal 
contacts with people from their own country, but this difference 
was not statistically significant (p > 0.05) and did not hold true for 
all nationalities. This weak or even non-existent verbal preference 
for one’s own nation can be understood if it is seen in connection 
with the prevalent norm o f internationalism, which condemns the 
openly expressed preference for compatriots as indicative of 
narrow-mindedness and parochialism. In other words, expressing a 
particular preference for friendly interaction with compatriots is 
socially undesirable; but this does not preclude, as will be seen, 
preferences for compatriots as shown by actual interaction patterns.
2) Apparently the norm o f internationalism did not forbid, or did 
so to a much lesser degree, the expression o f a preference for 
certain other nations than one’s own. The stated preferences 
confirm hypothesis 2: respondents expressed relatively strong 
preferences for interaction with members o f nations which are 
culturally similar to their own nation. To be more specific: people 
from "Northern" or Germanic countries (Britain, Ireland, Germany, 
Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium) tended to prefer the 
company o f people from other "Northern" countries, while people 
from "Southern", Mediterranean or Latin countries (France, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece) expressed stronger likings for people from 
other Southern countries. The following table shows the 
frequencies (preference for one’s own country is calculated as 




























































































Table 1 - North (N)-South (S) distribution in stated preferences 
for informal interaction with people from certain nations
chosen nation
N S total
respondent’s N 53 (65%) 28 (35%) 81 (100%)
nation S 14 (36%) 25 (64%) 39 (100%)
total 67 53 120
p < 0.01 in chi -square test
The North-South dichotomy was suggested by some respondents 
themselves: five o f them declared that they preferred the company 
o f people from Southern, Mediterranean, or Latin countries, while 
two said that they particularly liked people from Northern 
countries. This dividing line was also suggested by my own 
observations. Thus, the Institute’s bar, which very much looked like 
a Northern pub, was mainly visited by Northerners. This is a clue 
to one o f the probable reasons for this interaction preference gap: 
a difference in leisure habits. Another reason was language: while 
the Northerners easily communicated in English, most Southerners 
spoke better French and/or Italian.
Yet the hypothesis is confirmed only partially: when the 
dichotomy is broken down into separate nations, a nonconsistent 
relation between cultural similarity and interaction preferences is 
found. Thus, to give the most striking example: the Germans were 
never chosen by the Dutch as preferred company, nor were the 




























































































Dutch chosen by the Germans. The Germans were hardly chosen 
by other North Europeans too. The interaction preference network 
among North Europeans was actually a North-Western network, or, 
more specifically, a predominantly Anglosaxon network in which 
Danish, Dutch, and Flemish Belgians also took part.
The Germans were a-typical in that they 1) had relatively strong 
mutual bonds with the Italians (they preferred them relatively often 
and were relatively often preferred by them), 2) were hardly 
preferred by members o f others nations, and 3) showed relatively 
often a preference for members o f their own nation (which is, 
incidentally, in striking contrast with their low degree o f expressed 
national pride). This last characteristic may have been a 
consequence o f the second one, - because o f their relative 
impopularity in particular among members o f other Northern 
nations, they often preferred to be among themselves. Their 
relative social isolation with respect to other Northern nations 
(confirmed by data about actual contacts - see below) is an 
indication o f a covert cultural dissimilarity. From various 
observations one may get the impression that there is a "North- 
Western" - more specifically, British - style of informal sociability 
which involves irony, making quick jokes, being funny, and which is 
different from the German style. As will be pointed out more 
extensively, Germans were often described as over-serious, too 
disciplined, "heavy", lacking sense of humour, and these judgments 
were given most often by respondents from other Northern 
countries. It is unclear to what extent such judgments were really 




























































































stereotypes. They may partly reflect negative prejudices, fed by 
memories of the Second World War (even among those who were 
born after the war, as most respondents were). In this respect too 
the relations o f the British, the Danish, and the Dutch to the 
Germans are different from those o f the Italians, the Spaniards, 
and the Portuguese.
3) Hypothesis 3 is confirmed. The respondents were asked to 
mention the nationality of the five persons related to the Institute 
with whom they had most contacts outside their work, and in their 
answers they showed a tendency to have relatively frequent 
contacts with compatriots. All together they mentioned 105 
contacts with people o f their own nationality, which was almost 
one-quarter o f the total o f 428 contacts, and much more than 
could be expected on the basis of randomness. To all likelihood 
these results still underestimate the degree to which the members 
of this organisation are biased toward having friendly relations with 
compatriots: the answers are probably not completely reliable due 
to the social desirability o f showing a wide range o f international 
contacts. A  few answers sustained this suspicion; thus, one 
Portuguese remarked that he did not mention the other Portuguese 
who lived in the same apartment, since they were a kind o f family 
together (however, he did mention the Englisman who also lived in 
that apartment).
Unsystematic observations in the Institute’s restaurant and at other 
places also gave the impression that the tendency o f group 




























































































answers to the questionnaire suggest.
Even apart from this, the difference in the degree o f confirmation 
of hypotheses i and 3 is remarkable. While the respondents hardly 
expressed explicitly any special preference for having friendly 
contacts with people from their own nation, their self-reported 
interaction patterns clearly indicated something different. Here a 
gap appears between values and behaviour, between the ideology 
o f internationalism and the actual reasons for having contacts with 
the one or the other person. In interviews and informal 
conversations people hinted at such reasons in admitting that 
interaction with compatriots had its advantages: it was often easier, 
more relaxed, they said, because you had no language problems 
and could refer to the same background knowledge.
4) Hypothesis (4) is also confirmed, as is shown in the following 
table (contacts with compatriots are again calculated as random):
Table 2 - North (N)-South (S) distribution in self-reported 
informal contacts
nation o f respondent’s acquaintances
N S total
respondent’s N 144 (59%) 102 (41%) 246 (100%)
nation S 45 (43%) 59 (57%) 104 (100%)
total 189 161 350




























































































significantly more frequent than would be expected on the basis of 
randomness (p < 0.01 in chi-square test). This tendency is not very 
strong, however, and - contrary to what might be expected - 
somewhat weaker than the corresponding tendency in stated 
interaction preferences. The tendency was weakened by the fact 
that it was not shown by all the Northern nations nor all the 
Southern nations represented in this investigation. The Germans, in 
particular, were an exception again: in congruity with their stated 
preferences, they mentioned not only a relatively high number of 
contacts with other Germans (25 out o f a total 64 contacts, i.e. 
39%), but also many more contacts with Southerners - Italians in 
particular - than with non-German Northerners. The Italians for 
their part mentioned more contacts with Northerners, and Germans 
in particular, than with non-Italian Southerners. Thus, both in 
stated preferences and in mentioned contacts a special bond 
between Germans and Italians was found, which crossed and 
mitigated the interactional dividing line between Northern and 
Southern Europeans.
Speculating about the reasons for this bond between Italians and 
Germans one might refer to the historically strong relations 
between both nations. Before any serious explanation can be 
advanced, however, more research would be needed to see if the 
relation found here is more than coincidental.
The over-all conclusion o f this section is that nationality is indeed 
a nonnegligable determinant o f informal interaction patterns. 




























































































culture, which includes language, interaction styles, social 
knowlegde, and leisure habits. All these aspects o f culture which 
vary between nations to greater or lesser degrees may explain why 
respondents tended to have more contacts with members o f their 
own nation than with members o f other nations (although most of 
them denied having any special preference in that direction), and 
why they tended to have more contacts with members o f nations 
which were relatively culturally similar to their own nation than 
with members o f nations with a greater cultural distance from their 
own nation.
These findings are in accordance with well-founded sociological 
generalisations. Yet they are noteworthy in themselves, particularly 
in the light o f special characteristics o f this international 
organisation: the strong norm o f internationalism, and the relatively 
small cultural differences between the different national categories. 
It is to be expected that the tendency of group formation along 
national lines will be stronger in international organisations whose 
members do not adhere to a norm o f internationalism to such a 
degree, are not as well-versed in several languages, come from 
nations with larger national differences, and/or have special 
interests in cooperating with compatriots. It is also likely that 
problems will arise from this: misunderstandings, lack of 
cooperation, mutual distrust, and open conflicts. With the 
increasing importance of international organisations these problems 




























































































Images o f national character
The notion that each nation is a unique world of its own, radically 
different from other nations, is expressed most concisely in the 
concept o f national character, which refers to the idea that the 
members o f a certain nation are not only characterized by a 
common culture (knowledge, language and other symbols, rules o f 
behaviour), but also by a typical mentality, by psychological traits 
deeply ingrained in their personality (cf. Duijker & Frijda 1960).
EUI is a place where the psychological or behavioral pecularities of 
persons from different nations are often discussed. In spite o f their 
internationalist orientation, many members o f this international 
organisation cannot resist the temptation to speculate about what is 
typical for the English, the Germans, the Italians or the French. In 
this way the image o f nations as different sociocultural worlds - 
and, even more, as different psychological wholes - is confirmed 
and strengthened.
At the same time members o f this organisation often intimated 
that they were not very sure about the nature of the psychological 
differences between members o f different nations. When I asked 
people informally if they thought there were such differences, they 
almost always answered in the affirmative; but when I asked 
further to be specific about these differences, they very often said 
that they could not answer, that they had to think about it, that 
this was a difficult problem; and when they made some remarks 




























































































merely speculations and crude generalisations, which should not be 
taken too seriously. As intellectuals they had learned to be 
suspicious o f "prejudices" and "stereotypes" o f all kinds, and they 
did not want to be blamed for holding them themselves.
Hesitations with respect to the reality o f national characters also 
appeared in the answers to the question as to whether the 
respondent agreed with the statement "The people o f my country 
have certain personality traits which are, on the whole, different 
from those o f people from other countries". A  large majority of the 
respondents agreed with this statement, but most o f them did so 
with reservations; while only 7% rejected it completely and 22% 
agreed with it fully, most respondents opted for the intermediate 
alternatives - they subscribed to the statement "somewhat" (37%), 
or "to a large extent" (32%).
In spite o f these hesitations, only a few respondents refused to 
answer the questions about the mentality or personality traits of 
members o f specific nations. Contrary to the common practice in 
the research o f "stereotypes", these questions were kept open- 
ended. This was done in order to elicit more spontaneous answers 
(nearer to real-life situations), to avoid the restricting and biasing 
influence o f fixed answer-alternatives, and to leave room for 
nuances, specifications, and even explanations. It was considered, 
moreover, that the question if and to what extent certain central 
tendencies (i.e. some consensus) can be found is more interesting 
with the use o f open-ended questions, since the likelihood of 





























































































Questions about the mentality or personality traits o f the 
members of five Western European nations were asked: France, 
England, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. The first four are 
the largest and most powerful nations o f Western Europe and of 
the European Community in particular; the last one is a smaller 
nation, - among the smaller nations of Western Europe the one 
with the largest representation at EUI. The questions were put in 
comparative and relative terms ("In the following items you are 
asked to mention personality or mentality traits which, according to 
you, can be found more often among the people o f a certain 
country in Western Europe than among the people o f other 
Western European countries..."), which made it easier for critical 
respondents to answer at all, and which implies that the answers 
should not be interpreted simply as reflecting crude stereotypes.
The results clearly indicate differential images o f national 
character; that is, the frequency with which certain traits were 
mentioned varied considerably between the nations in question. For 
each nation certain central tendencies were found, i.e. charac­
teristics which were attributed frequently to it and which were 
attributed much less frequently or not at all to the other nations. 
From these results composite images of all the five nations could 
be inferred. In what follows I will deal with these images.
The French - The characteristic attributed most frequently to the 




























































































respondents mentioned this trait by using these very words and/or 
other terms which could be interpreted as belonging to the same 
cluster o f meanings - patriotic, militaristic, isolationist, ethnocentrist, 
xenophobic, racist, oriented to their own culture, 
reserved/cold/indifferent to outsiders. Next to nationalism came 
arrogance or pride as an often-mentioned French trait; 27% o f the 
respondents said that the French were arrogant, proud, preten­
tious, snobbish, intimidating, showing superiority. Both traits, 
nationalism and arrogance, were clearly related in the eyes o f at 
least some respondents; the French, they suggested, tend to isolate 
themselves from foreigners and treat them with contempt, because 
from their narrow-minded point o f view they feel superior.
It must be added that these characteristics were not only 
attributed to the French: both nationalism and arrogance were also 
mentioned as English traits, but less frequently; and arrogance was 
also attributed to Germans, but again, less frequently. (The Italians 
and the Dutch were regarded as neither nationalistic nor arrogant.)
What are the reasons for this perception o f the French as 
nationalistic and proud or arrogant? We may distinguish here 
between direct experiences (observation of and interaction with 
French people) and indirect experiences (information about French 
people through mass media and personal communication). Some 
respondents suggested indirect experiences as reasons for deeming 
the French nationalistic; they referred to France’s foreign, military, 
and cultural policy, - the stress on military autonomy and strength 
(the nuclear force de frappe). the propagation o f the French 




























































































government policy was interpreted as nationalistic and as reflecting 
the mentality o f the French people. Like in other cases, 
sociopolitical phenomena were made understandable through 
translation into collective-psychological categories.
Some respondents used stronger adjectives in typifying the 
French, such as "xenophobic" and even "racist". Here too 
information through mass media probably has played a decisive 
role; one may think of the electoral successes o f the party o f the 
extreme right, the Front National led by Jean-Marie Le Pen.
Recent survey data do not confirm the image o f the French as 
being extremely nationalistic. Although - as mentioned above - 
most o f them say they are (very) proud o f their country, they show 
less national pride than the British, and about the same as the 
Italians and even the Dutch (Euro-Barometer 21: 56-57).
As far as direct experiences are concerned: some respondents 
suggested a reason for the perceived "arrogance" by complaining 
about the French inability or unwillingness to speak any other 
language than French ("they only speak French and expect others 
to do so too"). Language behaviour may be indeed the key to 
explaining the perception of this trait. Although all French EUI- 
members spoke English, many of them apparently had difficulties 
with it and did not like to do it. This may be a reason why they 
preferred the company o f compatriots, - and this in turn may have 
been the reason for others to regard them as arrogant and 
nationalistic.
The definition of the French as arrogant, proud, self-assured or 




























































































corresponds to some extent with the results o f other investigations 
o f national images (5). It seems very difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish to what extent French people (or any people) "really" are 
arrogant or proud; as such categories do not only reflect 
observable behavioral traits but also normative judgments, they are 
hardly amenable for objective empirical research. This does not 
exclude the possibility that some aspects o f what is regarded as 
"typically French" behaviour might give the impression of a certain 
arrogance to some observers - e.g. the way the French language is 
spoken, the habit o f puffing, or a customary gesture like the 
shrugging of the shoulders.
These same or similar behavioral aspects may have contributed 
to the perception o f other, related traits which some respondents 
attributed to the French: that they were distant, cold, aloof, 
indirect (mentioned by 10% o f the respondents); and that they 
were individualistic, self-centered, self-indulgent, egocentric 
(mentioned by 14%). The second of these traits has also been 
found in other investigations o f national images; thus the 
respondents o f Peabody (1985) defined the French as relatively 
uncooperative and independent, much more than the English and 
the Germans. Besides, several authors have mentioned 
"individualism" as a typically French trait (6). Again, the extent to 
which the French really are "individualistic" is difficult to establish, 
if only because the term has various specific meanings. In so far as 
it refers to an ideal o f critical distance from authority and freedom 
from restrictive morality, it can be found in much o f French 




























































































as it refers to a relatively low degree o f "civic spirit" or a certain 
critical distance from formal rules and formal organisations, 
"individualism", according to some investigations, has been found to 
be somewhat stronger in France than in most other Western 
European countries (see e.g. Stoetzel 1983: 148). However, not all 
operational definitions o f the concept lead to this result (see e.g. 
Hofstede 1980: ch. 5).
Contrary to such qualifications as distant or aloof, a nonneglible 
proportion o f the respondents (13%) described the French as 
vivacious, enthousiastic, passionate, open, or charming. This 
corresponds with many written descriptions o f the French - their 
reputation as charming socializers, brilliant talkers, and passionate 
lovers (Zeldin 1983: 32-33). Some respondents tried to bring this in 
accordance with the perceived trait o f aloofness: the French, they 
suggested, are charming and vivacious within their own social 
circles, but to outsiders they show indifference and coldness. These 
respondents then bridged the gap between "aloofness" and "charm" 
by linking them both to nationalism.
One other trait was mentioned frequently about the French: 19% 
o f the respondents - and 38% o f the French respondents - said 
that the French were refined, civilized, cultured, elegant, that they 
had taste and style for eating and clothing, and a fine sense for 
arts and literature. This conforms with a widespread image o f the 
French and in particular with a French self-image. In so far as 
French people affirm this self-image toward foreigners, they may be 




























































































snobbish, and pretentious. This image is rooted in the past, 
particularly the age of Absolutism, when the royal court at 
Versailles was the main centre o f European civilisation, where the 
aristocracy cultivated increasingly refined manners, mores, and 
fashions, imitated by both the bourgeoisie within the French 
borders and the aristocracies elsewhere in Europe. Today certain 
norms o f politeness and forms o f style can still be found among 
French people - at least the upper and middle strata - that are 
connected with that aristocratic past: think e.g. o f the elaborate 
forms o f adress in letters, or the refinements o f cooking and eating 
(Zeldin 1983: 289 ff., 353; Mennell 1985). Such behavioral norms 
and forms confirm the image o f the French as highly civilized. It is 
also confirmed by the reputation Paris still holds as a world centre 
o f culture, o f old and modern arts, architecture, literature, and 
fashion.
Not all social facts correspond to the idea that the French are 
particularly interested in "culture" in the narrow sense; thus, the 
number o f books bought or borrowed from libraries per head of 
the population is low in France compared to other Western 
European countries. At the same time the formal emphasis on the 
value o f "high culture" is strong, as it appears in the educational 
system and in public statements of politicians (Heilbron 1981; cf. 
Bourdieu 1979).
The English - Like the French, the English were described by a fairly 




























































































nationalistic, chauvinistic, and isolationist. The differences with the 
French in this respect are not only a lower over-all score but also a 
different emphasis: terms like "nationalistic" and "chauvinistic" were 
used less frequently, terms which referred to a tendency o f isolation 
("isolationist", "insular", "ethnocentric", "parochial", "provincial") 
somewhat more.
Another similarity with the French is that two traits which could 
be (and sometimes were) associated with nationalism were mentioned 
rather often: pride or pretentiousness; and the tendency to keep a 
distance. Flowever, while for the French the first trait got much more 
emphasis than the second one, for the English it was the other way 
around: 13% o f the respondents described the English as proud- 
pretentious. snobbish, self-convinced, smug, or arrogant (although this 
last word was used only once), but no less than 35% reserved for 
them terms like reserved, distant, closed, cold, stiff, formal, withdrawn, 
or even "dead". More positive terms which could be placed under this 
umbrella were "phlegmatic", "self-controlled", and "polite". The key­
word here, used most often, is "reserved", expressing that combination 
of distance, formality and politeness which is, according to some 
observers, the essence o f Englishness.
Some respondents (14%) attributed to the English other, positive 
interaction qualities; they typified them as friendly, kind, cordial, well- 
meaning, nice, cooperative, easy, informal. Some o f these terms, such 
as "informal", contradict the image of the English as reserved and 
formal, but most do not: "friendliness" can go together with "distance", 





























































































In analysing the reasons for the ascription o f these traits we may 
again distinguish between direct and indirect experiences. The 
definition o f the English as nationalistic and isolationist is based 
largely, we may assume, on indirect experiences. It may have been 
shaped by reports on such recurring English rituals as the Changing 
o f the Guards at Buckingham Palace and the Last Night of the 
Proms, on events like the Falkland War, on royal marriages and the 
popularity o f Thatcher’s nationalist conservatism. In line with such 
information, some o f the respondents (9%) described the English as 
conservative, traditional, old-fashioned.
According to many respondents English nationalism takes the form 
o f isolationism. An important reason for this interpretation is probably 
the perceived European policy o f the British government and the 
reluctant attitude of cabinet ministers, party politicians, and journalists 
toward European integration. As symbolic o f this attitude may be 
regarded the common British distinction between Britain and 
"Europe" or "the Continent" (see e.g. Morgan 1987). English 
isolationism is then above all an isolationism as seen from a Western 
European and in particular a European Community perspective - 
much more than, say, from an American perspective; the perception 
o f this trait by (other) Europeans is a function o f the traditional and 
still continuing English orientation to the former colonies and 
dominions, the United States of America included. The suspicion that 
the English or the British are not very European-minded finds 
support in opinion polls: among the populations o f the EC countries 
the British, together with the Danes, are the least in favour of 




























































































more pro-European direction in recent years (e.g. Euro-Barometer 
21: var. 170; Eurobarometer 31, June 1989).
One possible reason for the alleged isolationism of the English, 
however, is not bound to a Western European perspective: the fact 
that Britain is an island. This easily leads to the image (and also the 
self-image) of Britain as a self-contained whole, isolated from the rest 
o f the world. "Island" may be taken both as a supposed reason for 
isolation and as a metaphor for it. The metaphorical application of 
the island-image appears in the adjective "insular", which was used by 
several respondents.
The same metaphor can also be used, and has been used, to 
characterize the tendency toward isolation o f individual English 
persons. As Emerson put it more than a century ago: "... everyone 
of these islanders is an island himself, safe, tranquil, uncommunicable" 
(quoted by Mayne 1972: 128). From this literary caricature an direct 
line o f continuity can be drawn to present-day qualifications like 
reserved, distant, closed, and withdrawn. This image is affirmed in 
numerous books, plays, and films. Some research data on national 
stereotypes indicate that the image is fairly widespread both as an 
English self-image and as an other-image held by foreigners (7).
Studies o f English "national character" have stressed this same trait. 
Thus, according to Gorer (1955) the English are characterized by a 
strong control o f primary impulses, particularly agressive impulses, 
which is embedded in the individual personality through strict child­
training, and which results among adults in reserve, politeness, and 




























































































English sense o f humour: irony and humour are defense mechanisms 
for coping with situations o f uncertainty, for hiding one’s feelings and 
canalizing hostile impulses in socially accepted ways. In attributing to 
the English a fine sense o f humour Gorer again reflects a more 
popular idea, which was expressed by 10% o f our respondents; they 
described the English as humourous, witty, or cynical.
Although the image o f the English as reserved, distant and formal 
(and humorous) is a traditional and conventional one, it may well be 
that it is partly confirmed - not formed - by direct experiences at 
EUI. The fact that the English in this organisation are well-educated 
members o f the middle class is relevant in this context: the traditional 
image refers primarily to the upper and middle classes, and members 
o f these classes are much more likely to conform to it. Probably some 
aspects o f the behaviour o f some English members o f the organisation 
- e.g. the habit o f not making gestures while speaking - were 
interpreted by respondents as confirmations o f notions about the 
English they already had before entering the organisation.
The apparent strong continuity o f the image o f the English is 
nevertheless remarkable in view o f the momentous changes o f  British 
society and life styles during the last decades, in which new groups 
came to the fore and attracted public attention. Fashionable youth 
groups, pop singers, and football hooligans, - their behaviour as it is 
reported by the mass media deviates completely from the traditional 
image o f the typical Englishman. But hardly any influence of such 
groups on the over-all image of the English can be detected in the 
answers to this questionnaire.




























































































pointing out that there were large differences within British society. 
First o f all, some British respondents emphasized that England is not 
Britain and that the English should not be identified with the British 
in general. Scottish respondents in particular defined themselves as 
quite different from the English - a different nation with different 
characteristics. Thus, one o f them contrasted English class 
consciousness, pretentiousness, and formality with Scottish
egalitarianism, modesty, and informality. Secondly, a few respondents 
referred to the large class differences in England and linked them to 
variations in discipline ("either over-disciplined or undisciplined") and 
civilisation ("ordinar bis extrem vornehm"). Class differences were 
sometimes linked to the geographical division between the North of 
England (predominantly working class, relatively poor) and the South 
(more middle and upper class, wealthier, more conservative). By such 
answers it was suggested that the conventional image of the typical 
Englishman refers to a particular social category: the well-educated 
and relatively well-to-do o f the male sex, mainly living in the Southern 
part of the country.
The Germans - In contrast to the French and the English, the 
Germans were never defined as nationalistic, chauvinistic, or 
isolationist. Some non-German respondents (5% ) described the 
Germans even as receptive, open to foreign influences and interested 
in other cultures. This non-perception of nationalism as a German 
trait corresponds with the relatively low degree o f national pride, 
noted above, which - according to surveys - is expressed by present- 




























































































the German respondents in this investigation. As remarked, this can 
only be understood in reference to the German past, particularly the 
period o f National Socialism, and the way this period is officially dealt 
with in present-day Western Germany. A  few respondents probably 
referred implicitly to that period when stating that Germans are 
"broken in their identity" and "ashamed of being what they are"; they 
suggested that Germans feel guilty about their past and therefore lack 
any positive identification with the German nation.
The attitude o f condemnation or strong scepticism toward one’s 
own nation is more likely to be found among German intellectuals 
than among other groups of Germans, and actually could be found 
among some German members of EUI. The perception o f Germans 
as relatively nonnationalistic was also confirmed by the language 
behaviour o f the German members: unlike many French members, 
they never assumed that foreigners would speak their language, - 
generally they did their best to speak English even to those non- 
Germans who understood German perfectly well.
The characteristic which was observed by far the most frequently 
about the Germans was, however, quite different, and referred to 
what was sometimes called their bureaucratic mentality. No less than 
44% o f the respondents used these or similar words, - they said the 
Germans were orderly, (over-)disciplined, (over-)organized, efficient. 
rule-obeving. punctual, rigid, inflexible. Moreover, according to many 
respondents (19%) Germans were hard-working, industrious, 
laborious, ambitious, "living for work", "oppressed by Leistungspflicht”. 




























































































respondents with terms like serious, dull, boring, "heavy", lacking sense 
of humour. Between these three perceived traits - orderliness, 
industriousness, and seriousness - there is a clear "elective affinity", to 
the extent that we may speak of one complex. The typical German 
here appears as the bureaucratic personality (cf. Merton 1968: 249 
ff.), who has internalized the social duties o f work, discipline, and 
rule-obeying to such a degree that they block potentials for social 
expression and enjoyment.
The German as a bureaucratic personality is a widespread image, 
which can be found both in data on national stereotypes (9) and in 
several treatises on German national character. Thus, four of the six 
traits advanced by Willy Hellpach (1954) as being essential to "the 
German character" refer to that image: industriousness, perfectionism 
(Griindlichkeit). love for order fOrdnungsliebel. and persistance or 
endurance. These traits have been interpreted psycho-analytically as 
symptoms o f an "anal character", an interpretation which is 
corroborated, according to the anthropologist Alan Dundes (1984), by 
the many German expressions, verbs, curses, rhymes showing a 
particular interest in human execretions.
Another psychological interpretation of the bureaucratic complex, 
which became influential shortly after the Second World War, is that 
of the "authoritarian personality": the character type o f those who, 
due to their strict and severe upbringing, combine the tendency of 
blind obedience to authority with the wish to dominate others with 
less power, and who therefore are potentially attracted by one or 
another version of Fascism. While according to the originators o f the 




























































































could be found in all advanced capitalist societies, the thesis was 
advanced that it was particularly widespread in German society; and 
some comparative research in the fifties, which made use o f the F- 
scale, confirmed the thesis, although only to a limited degree (Cohn 
& Carsh 1954; cf. also Kaldegg 1948). Needless to say that this theory 
and its application to Germany were developed under the impact of 
the emergence o f National Socialism and the Second World War; 
with the help o f this theory National Socialism could be explained as 
being rooted in the German authoritarian character. After the forties, 
when the Federal Republic o f Germany developed into a military ally 
o f the United States and a fairly stable democracy o f the Western 
type, this idea o f Germans as being particularly authoritarian became 
less popular, both among social scientists and - presumably - a larger 
public.
Among the respondents in this investigation the term 
"authoritarian" was never used for Germans. Quite a few (17%), 
though, used other expressions referring to hierarchy: they said 
Germans are "arrogant", "know everything better", "are convinced that 
they are right". In other words, in particular intellectual arrogance 
was attributed to Germans. In this respect too the respondents 
reflected a more popular idea about the Germans (10).
It is more than likely that the definition of Germans as 
bureaucratic, order-loving and hard-working was based, at least to a 
large extent, on indirect experiences. The image dates back to the 
nineteenth century, when the kingdom of Prussia developed into a 
powerful state with the help o f a bureaucracy which emphasized 




























































































carried the art of drilling to the utmost perfection. It was confirmed 
by the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian war o f 1870 and the 
subsequent German unification under Prussian domination. From that 
time on the typical German was largely identified with the typical 
Prussian, and Germany as a whole became feared by members of 
other European nations as an entity o f monstruous efficiency 
threatening the international balance o f power, - a fear which was 
intensified by the rapid industrial development o f Germany during the 
last quarter o f the nineteenth century. Anecdotes about German 
reverence for formal rules and uniforms and authorities became well- 
known, partly factual and partly fictitious, told in (both German and 
non-German) history books, short stories, novels, plays and films (see 
e.g. Moore 1978: 307). The dramatic events o f the Second World War 
and especially the systematic organisation o f mass killing in that 
period confirmed and sharpened the image o f Germans as blind 
followers o f rules and orders; it was shortly after the war that the 
phrase with which Germans accused of war crimes justified their 
deeds, "Befehl ist Befehl" (an order is an order), received its ominous 
meaning.
While the events of the Second World War are still widely 
discussed today, they are less interpreted in terms o f differences in 
national mentality or character. Among the respondents in this 
investigation no-one explicitly referred to that period. The definition 
of the Germans as disciplined, rule-obeying, efficient and hard­
working is still quite common, but much less associated with those 
past events. It has been confirmed after the war by the 




























































































Germany from an exhausted, poverty-stricken country to the first 
industrial economy in Western Europe and one o f the wealthiest 
countries in the world (some respondents referred to this 
development). Confirmation o f this same definition might also be 
found in East Germany, the state in the communist bloc (still existing 
in 1987) with the highest per capita output and notorious for its 
achievements in athletics.
Among scientists and scholars, like those o f EUI, the reputation 
of Germans as serious and hard-working is confirmed by stories and 
anecdotes about the industriousness and Griindlichkeit o f their 
German colleagues. Thus it is reported that discussion sessions at 
German scientific congresses are particularly long and exhaustive. 
Here again, personal experiences, hearsay and written sources 
probably reinforce each other in forming a composite and more or 
less consistent image.
In particular the fairly frequent definition by EUI-members of the 
Germans as over-serious, dull, boring, lacking sense o f humour is 
probably related to direct experiences, in the sense that it reflects 
differences in interaction style between German and non-German 
members o f this organisation. As noted before, it is especially the 
British-dominated style o f informal sociability to which most Germans 
(in contrast to e.g. the Dutch or the Danish) do not seem to be able 
or willing to conform. This interpretation is confirmed by the above- 
mentioned data about interaction preferences and actual contacts 
between Germans and non-Germans within this organisation.




























































































one part o f the typically German personality: they said that Germans 
are "romantic", "sentimental", "emotional", "pathetic", "extreme" (7%); 
or they described them as "complex", "full o f complexes", "awkward", 
"difficult to understand", "Angst-ridden" (10%). In these ways they 
intimated that bureaucratic rationality has its counterpart in 
irrationality, and that German formal correctness is a front behind 
which strong emotions are hidden - and sometimes suddenly 
expressed.
The typification of Germans as romantic or sentimental 
corresponds with both a widespread self-image and a reputation they 
have among foreigners, as may be inferred from many writings (e.g. 
Hellpach 1954). Romanticism as a literary and artistic movement 
became particularly influential in the German-speaking part of 
Europe. It was intimately connected here with the search o f members 
of the bourgeoisie - particularly intellectual members - for ideals, 
norms and and a life style of their own, different from and even 
opposed to those of the dominant Frenchified aristocracy. The ideals 
they propagated and sought to follow were expressed most concisely 
in the German word Kultur. referring above all to the cultivation of 
the inner virtues of the mind - thinking and feeling, and the authentic 
expression of one’s thoughts and feelings - as opposed to the 
aristocratic stress on outward appearances and polished manners 
implied by the word civilisation. The value put on Innerlichkeit. the 
inner virtues o f the mind, reflected the weak economic and political 
position of the German bourgeoisie in the 18th and the greater part 
of the 19th century: as their chances for economic success and 




























































































that in which they could feel superior to the aristocracy - in one word 
Kultur (Elias 1939, vol. 1: 1 ff.).
Kultur referred to both feeling and thinking, both the literary and 
artistic expression o f "true" emotions and the systematic exposition of 
philosophical ideas about the connections between the human mind 
and the outer world. From Kant to Heidegger and Habermas, from 
philosophical idealism to existentialism and critical theory, German 
philosophers have won a reputation as outstandingly "deep" thinkers. 
Some respondents to the questionnaire (9% ) confirmed this 
reputation by typifying the Germans as philosophical, deep 
I tiefsinnig). theorists, or metaphysicians.
All in all however, the respondents to this questionnaire laid much 
more stress on what is called here the bureaucratic complex as typical 
for the Germans - orderliness, industriousness, seriousness. Apart 
from some negative evaluations o f German sociability (expressed in 
terms like dull and heavy), the respondents thus conformed to a well- 
known, widespread, and long-established national image.
Only two respondents referred to a change in German mentality 
by calling attention to intergenerational differences. While elder 
Germans, they said, are traditionally authoritarian and strict, the 
younger ones are open, critical, searching, experimenting with new 
life styles. In this way, they suggested, Germans become less German 
and more generally European or Western.
The Italians - The image o f the Italians among the respondents in 




























































































the Germans. While English and Germans are described by many as 
stiff, formal, withdrawn, or emotionally repressed, the Italians appear 
as spontaneous, expressive, lively, open, uninhibited as well as 
sociable, available, oriented to personal contact. Italians, some 
respondents complain, are "noisy" and "talkative", but according to 
many more their sociability is a positive asset: they are warm. 
affectionate, friendly, kind, charming, sensitive, sympathetic. More 
than half of the respondents (54%) used these or similar terms, which 
may be regarded as referring to one personality trait: that of high 
expressiveness, or emotional sociability.
This trait can be associated with another one, put forward by 21% 
of the respondents: Italians are optimist, cheerful, joyous, gay, 
outgoing, "gourmands et gourmets", they have "joie de vivre", they 
know how to enjoy life. For some respondents this meant that Italians 
are "superficial" or "childish"; but many more used only positive terms 
for this trait.
In other respects however Italians were characterized in less 
positive terms; more than one-fifth (21%) o f the respondents labeled 
them as undisciplined, unreliable, disorganized, chaotic, inefficient, 
imprecise. Another 21% suggested a similar trait by describing the 
Italians as self-centered, egocentric ("males in particular"), egoistic, 
opportunistic, not oriented to the common welfare, lacking civic spirit. 
However, this was contradicted or at least amended by those (14%) 
who put forward a strong family spirit or, in more general terms, a 
strong group loyalty among Italians.
The label o f "spontaneity" was contradicted or amended by those 




























































































theatrical, insincere, conceited, concerned about appearances, 
"macho". Another 12% used similar, but more positive-sounding 
adjectives by stressing the Italian feeling for style; according to them, 
Italians are elegant, cultivated, artistic, well-dressed, rafines.
These traits, and in particular the first three o f them - spontaneity 
or expressiveness, cheerfulness, and lack o f discipline and efficiency 
- are recognizable as elements o f connotative meanings associated 
with "the South"; they reflect typical attitudes o f Northern Europeans 
towards Southern Europeans as well as typical self-definitions of 
Southerners when comparing themselves with Northerners. These 
attitudes do not only pertain to relations between Northern and 
Southern nations, but also to the relations between Northern and 
Southern regions within one European country (e.g. Italy or Germany 
or the Netherlands). Northerners tend to project certain desires and 
ego-ideals in which they feel they themselves fall short on 
Southerners, - human warmth, natural affection, passion, spontaneity 
and enjoyment of the good things o f life. "Warmth" has a double 
meaning in this context: it refers both to the higher temperatures in 
the South and to greater intensity and affectivity o f social life, and 
both are seen as interconnected (11). From the 18th century travellers 
and tourists from Northern regions have sought this double warmth 
along the Mediterranean coasts and particularly in Italy. And often 
they found what they missed in their home country there, or 
pretended to find it, as is testified by scores o f travel books, diaries, 
poems, novels, and short stories.




























































































criticism and complaints, - about its dirt and sloppiness, the bad 
organisation of its public affairs, the unreliability o f many o f its 
inhabitants. Just as tourists came back home with stories about 
romantic nights, charming men and beautiful women, they reported 
about trains that were never on time, pickpockets, crazy policemen, 
and swindling shopkeepers.
It is not difficult to see a connection between the supposed good 
and bad sides o f the Italians - spontaneity, affectivity on the one 
hand, lack o f discipline on the other hand. One might even say that 
spontaneity is lack o f discipline, seen from another perspective, as 
both words refer to the immediate following o f primary impulses and 
stimuli at hand. The same type o f behaviour which is ingratiating in 
informal social intercourse ("spontaneous"), may become a nuisance 
for the performance of some official task ("undisciplined"). In the 
continuum from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft the behaviour of 
Italians is perceived as relatively close to the Gemeinschaft pole; or, 
in terms o f Talcott Parsons’ "pattern variables", it is seen as being 
characterized by a relatively high degree o f affectivity, diffuseness, and 
particularism (Parsons 1955: 134ff.).
The widespread perception o f these traits does not prove that they 
are typically Italian in reality, even if only compared to other 
Western, and more Northern, European nations. The degree to which 
Italian social behaviour is characterized by spontaneity, liveliness, 
warmth, charm, and friendliness is difficult to establish, because such 
terms are highly normative and emotional, and only partially refer to 
observable behavioral traits. We may hypothesize that Italians in 




























































































nations 1) speak with louder voices, 2) make more gestures when 
speaking, 3) are quicker in their verbal responses to each other, 4) 
touch each other more frequently in direct interactions, and 5) 
interact more frequently among each other in streets, squares and 
other public places. As far as I know,Tio systematic research has been 
undertaken to confirm these hypotheses. In so far as they hold true, 
they form the empirical basis for value-laden interpretations expressed 
by words like liveliness, warmth, and spontaneity. Such interpretations 
however do not only reflect observed facts, but also norms, ideals, 
wishes, and sentiments of the interpreters. The ideals and wishes they 
express are often contrasted with what are regarded as Northern 
shortcomings - lack o f spontaneity, inhibitedness, coldness or shyness - 
and connected with the perception o f these shortcomings.
The bad side o f the imagined Italian type too - inefficiency, 
unreliability, lack o f discipline, lack of civic spirit - is not unrelated 
to observations and experiences. It is confirmed in stories which 
circulate among foreigners who stay for one or several years in Italy, 
such as the members o f EUI - stories about problems with getting a 
telephone or buying a house or crossing the Italian border with your 
own household furniture, the importance o f having friends or "friends 
o f friends" for getting things done, the slowness and unpredictability 
o f the postal system, the bad medical care, and so on. Foreigners 
from Northern countries are also often amazed, and sometimes 
outraged, when confronted with Italian "flexibility" in matters o f time 
and money.
The definition of Italians as undisciplined and inefficient is 




























































































connection is not self-evident or logical. The interpretation, and 
condemnation, o f certain types of behaviour as indicative of 
untrustworthiness, lack of discipline etc. depends, first o f all, on one’s 
own norms o f reliability and discipline and the degree to which one 
clings to these norms as being universally valid. And secondly, the 
interpretation o f this behaviour in psychological terms, i.e. as 
indicative o f a certain mentality or character type, is only one of 
several possibilities.
There are indications, however, that the definition o f Italians as 
undisciplined, inefficient etc. is not only held by many foreigners and 
in particular by inhabitants o f North Western Europe and North 
America, but is also part of a widespread auto-image held by Italians 
about themselves. The Italian respondents to the questionnaire gave 
this definition as frequently as the other ones. Among Italians too 
stories about the corruption and inefficiency of their bureaucracies 
abound, both in private conversations and in the mass media. Many 
of them tend to take over North-Western norms o f efficiency and 
public morality, and apply them to their own society; and in 
comparison to other nations Italy is regarded then as lagging behind, 
chaotic, corrupt, less developed. (The fairly high rate o f economic 
growth in Italy in recent years compared to other industrialized 
countries has mitigated this self-criticism somewhat and given reasons 
for national pride.) This image is held more particularly by Northern 
Italians with respect to the South o f their country: all the bad 
characteristics o f Italian society in general are seen as concentrated 
there. In this we-they-relation Northern Italians tend to hold similar 




























































































respect to Italians in general (see e.g. Schnapper 1974: 6ff.).
A  partial similarity in this respect between hetero-images and auto­
images o f Italians is borne out by the results o f some surveys among 
samples o f Western European national populations. Thus, in a survey 
from 1981 Italians were regarded as by far the least "trustworthy" o f 
Western European nations; compared to the French, the British, the 
Germans and the Dutch they were the only ones about which 
negative opinions concerning their trustworthiness dominated. This is 
not quite what Italians thought of themselves: they expressed positive 
opinions about their trustworthiness more frequently than negative 
ones. But while the respondents from the other considered nations 
thought much more positively about the trustworthiness o f members 
o f their own nation than that o f members o f any other nation, this 
tendency was not shown by the Italian respondents: they judged the 
trustworthiness o f their compatriots as about the same - on the 
average - as that o f the people from the other countries, and even 
less than the trustworthiness of the Germans and the Dutch (derived 
from Eurobarometer 14: var. 28-36).
The perceived traits of "spontaneity" and "lack o f discipline" may also 
be interconnected by linking them both to a third one: the observed 
strong orientation o f Italians to their own family or family-like group; 
or, in sociological terms, a high degree of "particularism". According 
to some social researchers and observers (Banfield 1958; Almond and 
Verba 1963; Barzini 1964) this is the key to understanding Italian - 
more specifically, Southern Italian - society and culture. For Italians, 




























































































has absolute priority compared to loyalty to the wider community; 
while within the personal group or family a private morality of 
solidarity, altruism and mutual support reigns supreme, a public 
morality o f respect for general rules and legitimate authority, honesty 
to one’s fellow-citizens, and an orientation to the common good is 
only weakly developed. Thus, the government is not regarded as an 
instrument for the common good, but as an alien force with interests 
of its own, which one should either try to evade or to profit from. 
Social relations outside one’s primary groups have only some sort of 
stability, in this orientation, in so far as they can be perceived as 
extensions of primary group relations. This strong particularism in 
Italian society has been explained historically by referring to the long 
period of "foreign" domination o f large parts o f Italy - the rule of 
Spaniards, French, and Austrians in the 16th to 19th centuries -, in 
which Italians could not identify themselves with the government, but, 
instead, learned to accomodate to it in opportunistic ways (Barzini 
1964). In the Southern part of the Italian-speaking area and especially 
in Sicily it was the low degree o f state formation and monopolization 
o f the means o f violence which gave rise to "private" solutions to 
social order problems, such as the Mafia organisations (Blok 1974).
Although this picture o f Italian society is something o f a caricature, 
some quantitative data o f comparative research confirm it to a certain 
extent. As noted above, Italians ascribe a relatively low degree of 
trustworthiness to their fellow-citizens. They also express a relatively 
low level o f trust with respect to their government and the political 
institions o f their country. They agree less frequently with statements 




























































































the interest in the people", and they express more discontent with 
"society" in general than other Europeans do (Stoetzel 1983: 65, 180, 
182, 190; Euro-Barometer 21: 109-110).
It is not difficult to see a strong and immediate connection between 
a high degree o f primary group particularism on the one hand and a 
low degree o f public "discipline" and conformity to public rules (be 
they tax laws or traffic rules or housing regulations) on the other 
hand. A  less evident, yet plausible connection may be established 
between group particularism and perceived "warmth" and "friendliness" 
in social intercourse. To the extent that people cannot and do not 
count on the general application of universalistic - legal, bureaucratic, 
contractual - rules, they will establish personal relations, involving 
diffuse mutual obligations, in order to get things done; in other 
words, they will extend particularism beyond their primary groups. In 
these relations the performance style - giving signals o f loyalty, trust, 
and friendship - is highly important. As this performance style extends 
to all kinds o f social interactions, it may give the impression of 
warmth and natural friendliness to the observer. A  paradoxical 
interconnection may be noticed then between a relatively high degree 
o f general social distrust and the perception o f a high degree of 
friendliness in social intercourse.
If this interpretation is true, it also means that the perceived 
"spontaneity" is only limited, that "warmth" is not a free expression 
o f emotions, and "expressiveness" a stylized expressiveness. And in 




























































































of Italian behaviour as theatrical, conceited, insincere. It may also 
lead to more positive qualifications like "refined". (However, some 
respondents to the questionnaire gave a somewhat different reason 
for this last qualification: they connected it to Italy’s reputation as a 
country o f great artists and excellent designers.)
We may conclude that more or less plausible - logical or empirical - 
connections between the different frequently mentioned traits 
ascribed to Italians can be established. These traits form a composite 
whole, a true character type - which facilitates the perception o f the 
Italians as "really different".
The picture o f the typical Italian emerging from the different labels 
is however not a completely coherent one. Tensions are to be noticed 
in particular between the interpretations o f Italian behaviour as 
natural versus unnatural, and as positive (good, desirable) versus 
negative (bad, undesirable). A  positive evaluation o f "natural" 
behaviour means that it is regarded as spontaneous, expressive, warm. 
In a negative judgment "natural" behaviour is undisciplined, 
disorganized, egocentric. "Unnatural" behaviour is labelled in negative 
terms as theatrical, conceited, insincere; in positive terms it is refined, 
elegant, sophisticated. These four possibilities indicate disagreements 
about how Italians really are.
A  final question concerns the reasons for labelling Italians as 
cheerful, optimistic, able to enjoy the goods things in life. This 
description is understandable from the tourist’s perspective, where 




























































































view o f the social environment; but it is shared apparently by many 
o f those foreigners who stay longer in Italy and have the opportunity 
to get to know Italians better. Clearly it fits with the description of 
Italians as affectionate, spontaneous, warm, and expressive. In 
common-sense psychological categorisations "expressiveness" or 
"spontaneity" is associated with cheerfulness rather than sadness. And 
both labels, expressiveness and cheerfulness, may have an 
observational base in behavioral characteristics mentioned above: the 
tendency o f Italians (statistically spoken, and compared to members 
o f more Northern European nations) to speak with loud voices, to 
make gestures, to respond quickly, and to touch each other in direct 
interactions.
The image o f Italians as cheerful and optimistic is, however, not 
confirmed at all by much o f modern Italian literary fiction; novels 
and short stories by such authors as Italo Svevo, Alberto Moravia, 
Cesare Pavese, and Natalia Ginzburg exhibit an extremely dismal 
view o f life. Something similar could be said o f films by famous 
directors as Antonioni, Fellini, and Bertolucci. Quite another 
refutation o f the image o f Italians as cheerful and optimist comes 
from ethnographic accounts o f the lives and mentalities o f peasants 
and workers (see e.g. Ariens 1986); thus the Southern Italian peasants 
described by Banfield (1958) showed an extreme pessimism, - for 
them life was controlled by alien and arbitrary forces and dominated 
by misèria. According to comparative survey research data too Italians 
are relatively pessimistic rather than optimistic. In responses to survey 
questions about general satisfaction and happiness Italians show 




























































































Western Europe. Thus in 1984 only 10% of the Italian respondents 
said they were "very satisfied" with their lives compared to e.g. 44% 
o f the Dutch respondents; 26.5% o f the Italians said they were "not 
very satisfied" with their lives (compared to 6% o f the Dutch), and 
10% that they were "not satisfied at all" (against 1.5% o f the Dutch) 
(Eurobarometer 21: var. 11). To a survey question in 1977 about 
personal happiness only 7% of the Italian respondents answered that 
they were "very happy", against 46% o f the Dutch respondents; while 
34% o f the Italians, and only 5% o f the Dutch, reported themselves 
to be "not too happy" (Eurobarometer 8: var. 118). Other surveys 
have yielded similar results; they all show that the differences in 
reported satisfaction and happiness between different Western nations 
are much larger than those within each nation along dimensions like 
class (income, education), sex, and age (Inglehart/Rabier 1984), thus 
testifying to striking differences in national culture. It would be naive 
to assume (as Veenhoven 1984 and Inkeles 1988 did) that these 
variations in self-report only reflect real differences in satisfaction or 
happiness. One explanation for the low level o f reported satisfaction 
and happiness among Italians is that it is expressive o f the high 
degree o f social distrust: by downgrading one’s own happiness one 
indicates to others that there is no reason to be jealous. However this 
may be, the tendency among Italians to describe themselves as 
dissatisfied and not too happy is an remarkable social fact, which 
contrasts strikingly with the widespread typification of the Italians as 




























































































The Dutch - At least one difference between the Dutch and the 
other four Western European nations considered here is undeniable: 
the Dutch comprise a much smaller, less powerful and less influential 
nation, which consequently attracts much less international attention. 
It is to be expected therefore that fewer Europeans have any idea 
whatsoever about the Dutch than about the French, the English, the 
Germans, or the Italians. This expectation is confirmed to some 
(slight) degree by this investigation; 21% o f the respondents did not 
say anything about the Dutch, a higher percentage than the 
percentages o f non-response with respect to the other four nations.
A  relative lack o f previous knowledge and beliefs about the Dutch 
among the respondents might have had one advantage: images o f the 
Dutch were formed to a relatively high degree on original 
observations, i.e. on experiences with Dutch people in this 
organisation. This might explain the fact that the trait ascribed to 
the Dutch with the highest frequency referred to an interaction 
quality which is not known as a widely popular stereotype: 30% of 
the respondents declared that the Dutch were friendly, kind, pleasant. 
sociable, easy-going. A  smaller number o f respondents (12%) 
expressed a different view by typifying the Dutch as reserved, cold. 
boring (more positive terms referring to similar behaviour were also 
used, such as calm). A  few respondents suggested that these 
seemingly contradictory traits were actually two sides o f the same 
character type: they described the Dutch as "reserved but friendly", 




























































































The second-most frequently mentioned trait about the Dutch - after 
friendliness or sociability - referred to their orientation to other 
nations: 20% o f the respondents stated that the Dutch were 
internationalist, cosmopolitan, multilingual, "open to the world". 
Multilingualism is the most specific and most easily observable aspect 
o f this cluster. As remarked before, the ability to speak and 
understand several languages is regarded as an important asset in 
this international organisation, and the Dutch members had a 
reputation o f being very good at it: not only did they speak English 
well (better at least than most people from the Latin countries), they 
also spoke German (contrary to almost all other non-Germans), often 
French, and, to a lesser extent, Italian; besides they had of course 
their own special language to be used among themselves, 
incomprehensible for all non-Dutch apart from some Belgians. By 
virtue o f this ability and because the Dutch were not suspected of 
seeking domination (being representatives o f a small nation), they 
were often seen as ideal intermediaries, as middlemen between 
different national groups with stronger interests and outlooks o f their 
own. This reputation probably contributed to the definition o f the 
Dutch as friendly, pleasant people.
Cosmopolitanism can also be linked to yet another trait, or cluster 
o f traits, put forward by 12% o f the respondents, implying that the 
Dutch are tolerant, egalitarian, democratic, progressive, liberal. Here 
we touch upon a widespread and well-known image, particularly as 
indicated by the terms "tolerant" and "egalitarian". Tolerance has been 
noted as a characteristic of Dutch society by many foreigners, and is 




























































































collective self-image (cf. Van Heerikhuizen 1982). In history books it 
is described as being rooted in a tradition which dates back to the 
seventeenth century, when persecuted refugees - like Protestants from 
Flanders and France, and Jews from the Iberian peninsula - entered 
the Dutch Republic and built up a new living there, and several 
religious groups co-existed fairly peacefully. Indeed, several foreign 
observers were struck by the tolerant social climate in Holland at the 
time, especially in religious matters (Haley 1988). (Catholics, Jews, 
and several Protestant minorities were however excluded from 
government positions, and it was only at the end o f the 18th century, 
with the help o f French revolutionaries, that they got full citizenship 
rights.) In recent years the image o f tolerance has been confirmed - 
though not always in favourable terms - for an international public 
by mass media reports about the amazing Dutch policy (more 
specifically, the policy of the capital, Amsterdam) toward criminals, 
drug addicts, unemployed, and ethnic and sexual minorities. The same 
reputation has been confirmed also by serious social scientific 
comparative policy studies (Bagley 1973; Downes 1988).
Egalitarianism seems to be less central to the Dutch self-image, 
but has been put forward by foreign observers as a striking Dutch 
trait. It has not always been interpreted favourably; it has been 
regarded by some as a lack o f feeling for true greatness, as an 
inclination to deny excellence and a preference for ordinariness and 
mediocrity (Baena 1966). (At least one respondent seemed to share 
this view by stating that the Dutch were "too democratic".) In more 
neutral terms, the image o f Dutch egalitarianism refers above all to 




























































































soberness among the well-to-do (12), a tendency to de-emphasize 
hierarchical differences among the occupants o f authority positions. 
This has been interpreted by some authors (like Phillips 1985) as 
hypocrisy: class differences in the Netherlands are not lesser than in 
other Western countries, they say, but they are hidden more 
effectively by the public stress on soberness and ordinariness.
Contrary to the image o f egalitarianism, a few respondents 
described the Dutch as arrogant, proud, arrivistic, or even (according 
to a Flemish Belgian) "megalomaniac". Somewhat more frequently 
terms were used which could be interpreted as indicating a specific 
type of "arrogance" - terms like stubborn, stolid, "sure o f their 
knowledge", "they know everything better". In other words, in so far 
as respondents suggested a certain arrogance as characteristic for the 
Dutch (as 10% could be said to do), they tended to specify it as 
arrogance in matters o f knowledge and opinions. In this respect the 
Dutch were seen as somewhat similar to the Germans.
Another one-tenth of the respondents ascribed to the Dutch traits 
which could be connected with "stubborness", - moralism. idealism, 
sentiments o f social responsibility. About the same number (11%) 
described them as hard-working, laborious, efficient, busy, active, 
enterprising. (Here another similarity with the German image is to be 
noted.) And again 11% o f the respondents referred to what is 
perhaps the most widespread stereotype about the Dutch: that they 
are frugal, sober, mean, "not very generous", commercial, profit- 
oriented, "money-conscious".




























































































one complex or cluster which is often denoted with the term 
Calvinist. (Actually, three respondents to the questionnaire used that 
term in typifying the Dutch.) Reserve in social interaction, 
stubborness, the tendency toward heavy moralism, laboriousness and 
work-discipline, frugality and soberness - all these traits belong to this 
complex. They fit in Max Weber’s classical account o f the Protestant 
ethic as a stress on the systematisation of daily life and the deferring 
o f immediate gratifications for the sake o f the attainment o f some 
long-term goal (Weber 1920). The term "Calvinist" for this complex 
serves not only descriptive but also explanatory purposes: it suggests 
that the prevalence o f these traits among Dutch people is due to the 
strong historical influence o f the Calvinist creed.
This image o f the Dutch as the typical Calvinists is more or less 
contradicted by another cluster o f traits referred to above: their 
reputed progressivism. their tolerance of all kinds o f deviance, their 
egalitarianism, their high-minded pacifism, liberalism and libertarianism 
- or, in less friendly terms, their apparent indifference toward basic 
social values, their lack o f social order and discipline.
Both complexes, however contradictory, have been connected to 
what several historians and sociologists have regarded as one the 
essential features o f Dutch society through the ages: its bourgeois 
nature, resulting from the economic, political and cultural dominance 
o f the urban bourgeoisie and the corresponding relatively weak 
position o f the landed aristocracy from the beginnings o f the Dutch 
state at the end o f the 16th century. It was especially in the 
province o f Holland, by far the richest and most powerful part o f the 




























































































dominated, and from this class - the upper stratum o f which consisted 
of wealthy merchants and their descendants, who became 
administrators on local, provincial, and national levels - cultural 
models permeated to other social classes (see e.g. Goudsblom 1967: 
15 ff.). The end result o f this process was conceived by the Dutch 
historian Huizinga in 1934 in these words: "Whether we like it or not, 
all we Dutch are bourgeois, from the notary public to the poet and 
from the baron to the common labourer. Our national culture is 
bourgeois in every sense o f the word. The bourgeois conception of 
what life is all about has been adopted by all the segments or classes 
o f our nation, whether rural or urban, the rich and the poor..." 
(Huizinga 1934; quoted by Van Heerikhuizen 1982: 107). While this 
bourgeois culture as a whole is characterized by a certain amount of 
soberness and moderation, and a corresponding distrust o f aristocratic 
over-refinement, two strains within it can be distinguished: that of 
religious moderation, tolerance, and humanitarianism on the one 
hand, and that o f religious orthodoxy, strictness and puritanism on 
the other hand. This tension came to the fore most clearly in the 
struggles between moderate and orthodox Protestants. Socially, it was 
connected to the distinction between the administrators and wealthy 
capital owners of the upper bourgeoisie, who were predominantly 
moderate, and the middle and lower sections of the bourgeoisie, 
among whom most orthodox Calvinists could be found. The tension 
between Dutch "Calvinism" and Dutch "progressivism" - in so far as 
these images do correspond to social reality - might be connected 





























































































It should be added however that the Dutch reputation of 
progressivism mainly dates back to the Sixties, when social turmoils 
shook the Western world as a whole, life styles changed rapidly and 
confusingly, and, more particularly, the ranges o f socially accepted 
behaviour were broadened. It was in that decade that Holland and 
particularly Amsterdam began to attract international attention as a 
centre o f international youth culture, where soft drugs could be 
consumed freely and sexual liberties were maximized. (Scandinavian 
countries had a similar reputation somewhat earlier.) At the same 
time important changes within Dutch society took place, partly 
corresponding to international - Western - changes in general, but for 
another part peculiar to that society. Welfare state provisions were 
extended considerably, thus contributing to a lessening of 
socioeconomic inequalities. Even more important perhaps were the 
changes that took place in the sphere of organized religion: whereas 
the pace o f secularisation quickened, the formerly closely knit 
politico-religious and ideological groups (the Protestant, Roman 
Catholic, socialist, and liberal "pillars" of society) were broken open - 
the borderlines between them began to blur; within the Dutch 
Roman Catholic community, in particular, a vast transformation took 
place, as it changed from the most reliable and orthodox branch of 
the Church to the most rebellious one, - thus contributing to the 
image o f the Dutch as being progressive; and among the Protestants 
too, a process o f partial radicalisation and loosening o f religious 
morals could be noted, as is testified by their active participation in 
the peace movement, which won vast popularity in the Netherlands 




























































































lated changes a continuation o f the Calvinist tradition may be 
detected: as the impact o f orthodox Calvinism and organized religion 
in general diminished, the Calvinist style o f heavy moralizing - 
exemplified traditionally by the Calvinist ministers, but also observable 
among the Roman Catholics, who were influenced by Calvinism - was 
maintained and re-directed toward secular goals (cf. Zahn 1984)(13). 
Modern progressivism might be interpreted then as a continuation o f 
both the "moderate" version o f Dutch bourgeois culture (in so far as 
it involves the values o f tolerance and humanitarianism) and its 
"Calvinist" version (in so far as it implies a heavily moralistic stance).
It should be repeated that these well-known images o f the Dutch 
were not the ones mentioned most frequently by the respondents of 
this investigation. As far as I know, "friendliness" or "sociability" has 
been hardly mentioned in the literature about the Dutch character, 
and "internationalism" or "cosmopolitanism" has been mentioned 
mainly by Dutch authors, thereby expressing a peculiar mixture of 
nationalism and internationalism, o f national modesty and national 
pride. As said before, the ascription o f these traits by our respondents 
is probably related to direct experiences with Dutch people in this 
international organisation. The ability o f the Dutch members o f EUI 
to speak several languages and, as a consequence, their relatively easy 
contacts with people from different nations have probably contributed 
to their reputation o f not only internationally oriented, but also open, 
friendly, and sociable. Tourist experiences in the Netherlands may 
also have played a part in the formation o f these images. In informal 




























































































Netherlands very friendly when they were there on holidays, and they 
sometimes contrasted the easy, informal ways o f Dutch policemen and 
ticket controllers with the more formal and authoritarian behaviour 
o f these functionaries in their own countries. As people tell such 
experiences to each other, they may become the basis for new, more 
or less stereotypical images.
Comparisons and conclusions
What has been remarked in the introduction o f this chapter can be 
presented now as a conclusion: the images of these five Western 
European nations are clearly differentiated from each other. We may 
summarize concisely, though crudely, by listing the six traits 














































































































From this simplified summary we can easily see that the pattern for 
each nation is unique, although several ascribed traits are shared by 
more than one nation. Thus, the French share some ascribed traits 
to some extent with the English (nationalism, arrogance, 
reserve/distance), and other ones with the Italians (refinement, 
charm/liveliness, individualism/egoism); but the combination is uniquely 
French. Among the four traits mentioned most frequently about the 
English three are also ascribed to the French (although partly in 
other terms with slightly different meanings) and one to the Dutch 
(friendliness); while the other two traits o f the list o f six are hardly 
mentioned for other nations than the English. Some o f the traits 
clearly form pairs of contrasts: thus, Italian liveliness contrasts with 
English reserve, French distance, and German and Dutch seriousness; 
English conservatism contrasts with Dutch progressivism; Dutch 
internationalism with French and English nationalism; and German 
orderliness with Italian lack of discipline.
This strong differentiation o f national images is the more striking 
since there are reasons not to expect it in this case: the imagined 




























































































culturally, politically, economically - and each o f them can be 
regarded as part o f a wider, European or Western, society; the 
differences were generated by an open-ended question, i.e. they were 
not suggested by fixed answer-alternatives; and the answers were 
given by respondents who adhere to an internationalist ideology and 
have learned to be suspicious o f crude generalisations, stereotypes 
and prejudices. Yet even these respondents generalize, and typify. For 
them, too, nations are not only political entities, but cultural and 
psychological realities.
Most o f the frequently mentioned national characteristics refer to 
general attitudes, public morality and/or aspects o f life style: e.g. 
"refined", "conservative", "orderly", "undisciplined". Some characteristics 
are very general personality traits, e.g. "cheerful". Other characteristics 
are more specific in that they pertain to attitudes to particular 
collectivities (e.g. "nationalistic"), or a particular sphere o f life (e.g. 
"frugal"). An important category of frequently mentioned
characteristics may be called interaction qualities or interpersonal 
response traits (cf. Krech et.al. 1962: 103 ff.); adjectives like 
"arrogant", "charming", "distant", "reserved", "friendly", and "lively" 
belong to that category.
All in all a strong tendency of psychologizing, o f defining group 
characteristics (i.c. national characteristics) in terms o f individual 
personality traits, can be found here (14). Another tendency is that 
o f moralizing, or, more in general, o f giving value-judgments. Most 
of the terms used in the typifications are nonneutral, value-laden, 




























































































is not always clear: an expression like "perfectly organized" for the 
Germans may have a positive or a negative meaning; and a term like 
"nationalistic" is probably meant to be critical in this context, but not 
necessarily so. On the other hand, some terms were used which did 
not have any descriptive content and were only expressive o f positive 
or negative sentiments - e.g. "nice", "pleasant", or "a good way of 
living".) The generalisations about nations found in this questionnaire 
apparently fullfil a double function for those who make them: of 
creating cognitive order, making the sociocultural world coherent and 
understandable; and o f giving sense to one’s own emotions by 
defining different attitudes toward different collectivities.
The use o f value-laden terms in characterizing a nation does not 
imply, however, that the over-all judgement o f that nation is either 
positive or negative. Respondents’ judgments in this questionnaire 
were often of a mixed nature. For example, a Belgian respondent 
stated about the Germans: "serious, boring, well-informed"; and 
another Belgian about the same people: "nice, always on time, 
sometimes dull". An Irishman described the English as "racist, 
chauvinist, self-complacent, but also polite, generous and naive"; and 
a French woman remarked about the English: "conformist, very 
formalistic, rather hypocritical/ very tolerant, nice contact/ a bit 
xenophobic/ no sense of esthetics in everyday life". Over 40% of the 
descriptions cum evaluations of a given nation could be classified as 
neutral or mixed, the rest being divided about evenly between positive 
and negative judgments.




























































































characteristics between respondents from different nations were 
found. This may be due to the small number o f respondents from 
each nation. Yet the similarities in the responses between members 
o f different nations are striking; no generalisations were typical for 
the respondents o f only one or a few nations, and the frequently 
mentioned traits were suggested by members of all the nations 
represented with relatively large numbers among the respondents.
The similarities are even more striking when the answers of 
respondents about their own nation (self-definitions) are compared 
with those o f other respondents (other-definitions). As it appears, 
the clearest over-all difference between self-definitions and other- 
definitions is that the first in general contain more specific statements, 
in other words are more extensive and complex. All the traits 
attributed to one of the five nations with a relatively high frequency 
were also mentioned by some members of that nation, and most of 
these traits more frequently by them. Thus, one-half of the French 
respondents described the French as nationalistic, the same number 
regarded them as arrogant or proud, while for 38% the French were 
refined, civilized or "cultured". Again one-half o f the British 
respondents shared the view that the English are reserved, closed, 
formal. And no less than 62% o f the German respondents used terms 
like disciplined and orderly for their own nation. Contrary to what 
might be expected on the basis o f other investigations, self-definitions 
were on the whole not more favourable than other-definitions. The 
French, English and German respondents were, on the average, just 
as critical about their own nation as other respondents were; the 




























































































attitudes toward their nation than the other respondents, but only to 
a slight degree. (As far as the Italians are concerned, this corresponds 
with their relatively high degree o f expressed national pride, as noted 
above. For the Dutch, on the other hand, it seems to contradict with 
their low level o f expressed national pride; we may detect here a 
discrepancy between openly expressed nationalism and covert, 
indirectly expressed nationalism, the first being more or less tabooed 
among Dutch intellectuals.)
This high consensus between nations about national images may be 
attributed to either 1) specific shared experiences at EUI and the 
formation o f an organizational culture based on those experiences, 
or 2) the existence of widespread national images which are neither 
bound to this international organisation nor to any specific nation. 
The second possibility is suggested by the correspondence, noted 
above, between many o f the frequently mentioned traits, the results 
o f other investigations o f national stereotypes, and statements about 
national character found in both popular and scholarly literature.
In order to test this hypothesis more systematically, a limited 
investigation was carried out in the first half o f 1988. A  number of 
80 Dutch undergraduate students in the social sciences were given 
a list o f 24 adjectives which referred to the national characteristics 
frequently mentioned by the participants in the EUI investigation. 
The respondents were asked to choose among five Western European 
nations - again, the French, the English, the Germans, the Italians, 
and the Dutch - a) the one which was characterized most strongly by 




























































































this respect, and c) the one which was characterized the least by each
o f these adjectives. Total scores for each nation-adjective pair were
computed by assigning +2 to choice a, +1 to choice b, and -2 to
choice c. The results are summarized in the following table:
Table 3 - Total scores of choices of nations by Dutch respondents 
(N = 80) related to given characteristics
French English German Italian Dutch
nationalistic 71 9 91 17 -8 9
arrogant 65 0 75 -15 -10
individualistic 16 23 21 -51 89
re fin ed 96 27 -49 33 -13
reserved 22 115 8 -104 40
isolation ist 43 64 26 2 -4 7
con serv a tive 17 106 42 4 -6 6
h u m orou s 15 86 -5 6 31 14
ord er lv -1 6 57 79 -77 45
seriou s -7 5 62 -75 62
hard  w ork in e -7 15 84 -67 79
c o m p le x 23 21 1 9 26
p h ilosop h ica l 75 11 26 -15 -21
rom a n tic 74 -25 -33 103 -2 6
SD ontaneous 43 -41 -45 124 -31
ego istic 30 7 54 -9 22
un discip lined 34 -13 -53 97 15
ch eerfu l 36 -7 -4 6 120 -1 6
theatrica l 49 -20 0 109 -45
friend ly -3 65 -50 46 34
cosm oD olita n 1 37 -11 2 66
progressive 24 -63 -4 11 106
frugal -1 8 31 22 -73 125
m ora listic -2 35 29 -4 51
This table shows a clear differentiation o f national images; for almost 
all the terms, the score differences between the nations are fairly 
large and outspoken (and statistically significant). When we compare 
these data with the answers to the EUI questionnaire, a high 
correspondence can be seen. In 15 o f the 24 cases (underlined in the 




























































































most strongly by the given trait also received the highest score from 
the respondents in this second investigation. In one case - the 
adjective "serious" - the Germans and the Dutch got the same highest 
score, while according to the EUI respondents this trait is more 
peculiar to the Germans. In the cases o f "nationalistic" and "arrogant" 
the French are rated second here (after the Germans), while 
according to the EUI respondents the French are characterized more 
than any other nation by these traits. As for the adjective "friendly", 
three nations get a relatively high score: the English, the Italians, and 
the Dutch (in that order); and these are also the nations to which the 
same trait is attributed relatively often by the EUI respondents (be 
it in a different order o f frequency). We may conclude then that the 
images o f Western European nations suggested by EUI members are 
not peculiar to that organisation, but are held by many people in (at 
least) Western Europe. To a great extent these are popular images 
not bound to any specific nation or group within a nation.
There are some notable exceptions to this over-all correspondence 
between the results o f the two investigations, however, which ask for 
a (tentative) explanation. The tendency o f the Dutch respondents, in 
contrast to those o f EUI, to regard the Germans as extremely 
nationalistic, arrogant, and egoistic probably reflects continuing 
negative attitudes of many Dutch people toward the Germans, which 
are connected with the experiences o f war and German occupation 
in 1940-1945, and probably also the present strong dependence of 
Dutch prosperity on the German economy. The frequent self­
definition o f the Dutch as "individualistic" corresponds to a well- 




























































































connected to the traditions o f tolerance and verzuiling (pillarization), 
or, more specifically, the "typically Dutch" tendency to form ever new 
groups based on particular creeds. The slight tendency o f the 
respondents to regard the Dutch as more "complex" than people from 
the other nations (however, this trait hardly differentiated between 
the five nations) conforms with the general tendency to perceive more 
complexity in entities one knows more about. Finally, the very 
different attribution o f "romantic" in the two investigations reflects, to 
all likelihood, a different interpretation o f the word: the EUI 
members who described the Germans as "romantic" referred to 
Romanticism as a cultural tradition, while the Dutch respondents 
followed the more popular meaning o f the word and associated it 
with "romance", i.e. erotic love. The attribution o f "romantic" to the 
Italians, and, to a lesser extent, the French can be connected then 
with the stereotype o f the "Latin lover".
To conclude: the thesis that the descriptions o f the five nations 
given by the EUI respondents reflect popular, widespread, nonspecific 
images held by many Western Europeans from different nations is 
largely confirmed, but not completely. Needless to say more research 
is needed for further confirmation and elaboration o f this over-all 
conclusion.
How to explain the popularity o f certain national images? In dealing 
with specific images some answers to that question have been 
suggested in this section. These answers implied that two extreme, 
opposite assumptions should be rejected: on the one hand, that 




























































































observed reality to which they refer, or at least are fairly adequate 
approximations o f that reality; on the other hand, that they have no 
relation whatsoever to the reality to which they refer, and merely 
reflect the prejudices, emotions and morals o f those who hold these 
images. The first assumption is contradicted by the normative, value­
laden nature o f most of the verbal specifications of national images 
and, more fundamentally, by the empirical untestability o f most of 
them. The second assumption becomes unlikely (though theoretically 
not impossible) in the light o f the widespread consensus about certain 
traits of a certain nation among members o f different nations, and of 
the plausible links that can be drawn between observed facts with 
respect to the nation in question (e.g. historical events or current 
politics) and the traits mentioned. Any explanation o f national images 
should start from the assumption that they are related to the 
observable reality they refer to, and at the same time represent 
selections from and interpretations, simplifications, evaluations and 
even distortions of that reality.
National images are formed on the basis o f information: direct 
experiences (i.e. observation o f and interaction with members o f the 
given nation) and indirect experiences. The indirect experiences may 
take the form o f written information, nonwritten verbal 
communication, or pictures. They may involve personal 
communication, or mass media messages. These messages may be 
purposefully fictitious (e.g. novels or films or plays) or pretend to be 
purely factual (e.g. newspaper reports). They may refer to current 
events, or to the past. They may or may not explicitly refer to 




























































































people form national images, which in turn function as a basis for 
selecting and interpreting new information.
Within the whole range o f information the direct experiences are 
a special category. They are, so to speak, the real basis on which a 
vast symbolic superstructure is erected. Although not objective in any 
sense, they are often regarded as the ultimate proof for the truth- 
value o f statements about national character. People who have lived 
in a country for a longer period, tend to be seen, and to see 
themselves, as experts - they "know" how these people really are.
For the EUI respondents such direct information was at hand. 
Through their frequent contacts with people from different Western 
European nations they were able to compare the behaviour o f the 
members of these nations by their own observations. To a certain 
extent they might be regarded as experts on national peculiarities, and 
some veterans in the organisation regarded themselves as such.
Most EUI respondents had the feeling that their experiences in 
the organisation had modified their ideas about different nations. A 
majority o f 65% declared that their ideas about the cultural and 
psychological differences between nations had become "clearer" since 
they had come to EUI (while only 6% declared that these ideas had 
become "less clear"). For one-third of the respondents these 
differences had become more marked, while less than one-quarter 
(23%) declared that these differences had become less marked for 
them (for 41% the differences had remained the same). The tendency 
toward the perception o f larger differences was stronger as far as 
subjective preferences were concerned: 44% o f the respondents stated 




























































































become stronger since they had come to EUI, while only 11% 
answered to the contrary (37% said their preferences had remained 
the same). In other words, in so far as the respondents reported a 
change in their cognitions and feelings on the basis o f their contacts 
with members o f different nations, it tended to be in the direction of 
a perception of clearer and larger differences and more outspoken 
preferences. In this sense, one might infer, the common ideology of 
internationalism was undermined by experiences in the organisation 
itself.
In spite o f these self-reported changes on the basis o f direct 
experiences, most statements about the different nations by EUI 
members conformed to fairly popular, well-known national images. 
Their ideas about these nations became more complex and more 
detailed, but hardly deviated from what is found among other 
Western Europeans and in written sources. This testifies to both the 
impact and the "validity" o f these images. The perceptions o f national 
differences within the organisation by its members were no doubt 
influenced by their pre-conceived ideas, formed on the basis of earlier 
(and largely indirect) information; at the same time, certain forms of 
behaviour of certain members o f the organisation were observed 
which could be interpreted as confirmations o f these pre-conceived 
ideas. To all likelihood, too, direct experiences have activated vague 
ideas, and sharpened and specified vague notions. (The potential 
correspondence between pre-conceived images and observations in the 
organisation is enhanced by the fact that the large majority o f EUI 
members is middle class: popular national images refer much more to 




























































































The striking similarities between the statements o f the EUI members 
about national characteristics and national images known from other 
sources may also be due, to some extent, to verbal impotence. As 
noted before, it was said by some of them that they perceived clear 
differences between members o f different nations, but found it 
difficult to describe them. When they and others nevertheless took 
the effort, they did so with the help o f conventional concepts and 
expressions - as is usually the case.
The notion o f a European identity
National identities do not exclude the co-existence o f other collective 
identities, which refer to smaller social units, such as regions, or to 
larger units, such as "Europe". As international links of 
communication and interdependence become stronger, it is to be 
expected that identifications with larger-than-national units grow; in 
particular, it is to be expected that in the course o f further European 
integration the identification with "Europe" as a meaningful 
sociocultural unit will spread and intensify. This is at least what policy 
makers o f the European Community wish to see and to stimulate; 
they look for a "European identity" as a ground for cooperation and 
a source o f inspiration. Is this notion o f a European identity merely 
a piece o f propaganda, or has it significance for ordinary citizens in 
the European Community? And if it has significance for them, what 
kind o f significance?




























































































o f a European identity indeed had significance, if this is indicated by 
their agreement with the statement: "We, Europeans, have a common 
identity which distinguishes us from people from other parts o f the 
world" (47% o f the respondents agreed "to some extent", 18% 
"strongly"). Only 17% disagreed. No less than 85% of the respondents 
said they defined themselves as "European" (31% with the stricture 
"to some extent"), while only 6% declared they did not. When asked 
what was more important, their self-definition as European or as 
English, French etc., almost as many respondents chose the first 
alternative as the second one: 38% against 41%.
According to the Eurobarometer surveys financed by the European 
Community something like a European consciousness is not absent 
among the population o f the EC-countries at large. Thus, in a survey 
held in all the EC countries in 1984, 72% o f the respondents 
(weighted proportions) said they were in favour o f European 
integration - 46% with the stricture "to some extent" -, while 10% 
said they were against it (Euro-Barometer 21: var. 170). In the same 
survey 55% declared the EC-membership o f their country "a good 
thing", while 11% found it "a bad thing", and 27% "neither good nor 
bad" (idem: var. 189). These opinions were not spread out evenly 
over the countries: the people from the Netherlands, Italy, France, 
and Belgium - in that order - were above average in their favourable 
attitudes toward the European Community, the people from the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Greece were below average. 
Surveys in other recent years have yielded similar results.
Public opinion in Western Europe is less favourable toward 




























































































maintenance o f national integrity. In a survey o f 1984 a majority of 
respondents in all the EC-countries were against ambassadors for the 
European Community as a whole in the place o f ambassadors for 
each o f the member states, as well as against one European Olympic 
team. And in a survey o f 1978 in the European Community, two- 
thirds o f the respondents agreed with the statement that national 
autonomy should have priority anyway (Eurobarometer 10: 89). In 
other words, the majority o f the population o f the European 
Community seem to support both European integration and national 
autonomy; but when a contradiction or tension between the two 
becomes apparent, they are inclined to give priority to national 
autonomy.
The respondents in our investigation seem to be less nationalistic 
and more European-minded than the EC population as a whole, - not 
surprising for members o f a European Community organisation. To 
all likelihood, both selective recruitment and the influence o f the 
organisation are factors in the relatively high degree o f European- 
mindedness. This organisational influence does not consist in outward 
propaganda for European integration, but in the stimulation o f 
scholarly attention for European policy, European history, common 
European problems as well as in the cooperation between Europeans 
from different countries. (As noted above, this cooperation is not 
without tensions and may also enhance feelings o f national identity.) 
European-mindedness is related to, though not identical with, the 
ideology o f internationalism; although internationalism in its purest 
form does not stop at European borders (or at any borders), it 




























































































with larger groupings than the nation-state.
Among those respondents who identified with Europe, the terms 
most often used to define the European identity were culture (20 
times) and history (17 times). Europeans, they said, have a "common 
culture", a "cultural heritage", or distinct "cultural traditions"; which 
means, as some respondents specified, that they share certain "values", 
"assumptions about life", or "concepts of rationality", that they have 
a common religious heritage (Christianity), or participate in distinct 
artistic and literary traditions. Three respondents used the term 
"civilisation" in their definition o f the European identity. In the 
specifications o f Europe’s common history reference was made to 
cultural traditions as well as shared political experiences (including 
wars). Some respondents suggested that Europe does not only have 
a distinct history and culture, but also have more o f it than other 
societies: a particularly long recorded history, which is manifest in the 
present through old buildings, old art, and old continuing traditions 
(the "old world"); and a highly developed culture or civilisation, 
accompanied by "sophistication", or, some said, scepticism, cynicism, 
self-criticism.
The essence o f the European identity, some respondents suggested 
- thus echoing innumerable writings -, is paradoxically its diversity, 
pluralism, heterogeneity, the differences o f landscape, language and 
cultural style in a cramped space. Europe’s unity lies above all in the 
common recognition o f and respect for this diversity.
This recognized pluralism can be related to political characteristics 
put forward by some respondents: liberalism, liberal democracy, 




























































































characteristics, indicated by terms like "industrial", "advanced 
capitalist", or "wealthy".
Reference was also made to common problems as giving substance 
to Europe’s identity. These were specified as socio-economic 
problems, or as politico-military problems arising from Europe’s 
geopolitical location between the two superpowers. A  few respondents 
linked this to Europe’s history, its loss o f political power and 
economic dominance in the course of this century. Europe is defined 
here as what some authors (like Morin 1987: 165 ff.) have named a 
Schicksalsgemeinschaft. a communauté de destin, a community o f fate.
With all these kinds of definitions the question remains if and to 
what extent the mentioned characteristics are distinctly European. 
Do they really distinguish Europe from all other parts of the world? 
In so far as respondents dealt with this question, they almost always 
stressed the difference with the United States, or (North) America. 
They did so, we may presume, not because they found this difference 
larger and clearer than that with Asian or African societies, but 
precisely because they could not take it for granted. The distinction 
with North America was emphasized because it is the most 
problematical, North American culture being an outgrowth o f that of 
(Western) Europe, and the similarities between both being expressed 
by their common denominator: "the West”. Europe is regarded then 
as the non-American West, which distinguishes itself from its 
dominating daughter not by features that both have in common - like 
industrial capitalism and liberal democracy - but, as some respon­





























































































Related to this, and even more basic, is the question o f the 
boundaries o f Europe. Does Europe as a meaningful sociocultural 
entity embrace the whole o f the continent - from the Atlantic to the 
Ural -, or only part o f it? And which part then? If Europe is part of 
the West, what are the boundaries o f the West? Our respondents 
hardly entered into these questions, although many o f their answers 
suggested that Europe for them meant Western Europe in the first 
place. In this they followed a common Western European usage 
(exemplified and stimulated by the European Community) to regard 
the Western part o f the continent as the real Europe. Eastern 
Europe, in this view, does not belong to "Europe" as sociocultural 
unit, or has a marginal position with respect to it. These same 
ambiguities are found in the meanings o f "the West". As a political 
concept the West refers - or used to refer, until recently - to a 
division within geographical Europe between liberal-democratic- 
capitalist and communist states. But it has also been used to 
distinguish the non-Russian Soviet-dominated parts o f Europe, with 
some tradition o f liberalism and Roman Catholicism, from Russia, 
with its tradition of despotism and its religious heritage o f Eastern 
Christendom. And in the broadest, cultural sense, the West comprises 
practically the whole o f geographical Europe, including Russia. 
According to this last definition the boundaries o f sociocultural 
Europe, as part o f the West, are more or less identical with the 
boundaries o f geographical Europe.




























































































identified with the European Community. Some (seven) respondents 
solved the boundary problem in this way. Europe, they suggested, 
exists as a meaningful category in so far as there is a common 
organization which strives for further integration. European identity 
exists as a will to unity, a will to create an identity. A  double 
meaning o f the concept o f "identity" can be found here: on the one 
hand, identity is conceived as something given, an undeniable essence 
rooted in the past; on the other hand, it is something which has to 
be created or at least enhanced by purposeful action. Both meanings 
are implicit in public debates about the European identity 
(Schlesinger 1987). Although one may criticize this duality on logical 
and empirical grounds, it should be recognized that various social 
movements have succesfully employed it: by stressing the essential, 
already given unity o f the groups they claimed to represent (the 
workers, for example), these movements also enhanced it. This holds 
particularly true for nationalistic movements. Elowever distorted their 
views on the past and present were (they tended to project their 
ideals on social reality, magnifying, eternalizing, and naturalizing the 
bonds o f national unity), these were often quite effective in terms of 
their social consequences.
The same might happen to the European movement, - by evoking 
an already existing common identity it might make this identity into 
something real. However, compared to the processes o f nation 
formation in the past centuries, this development o f collective identity 
formation on a European scale is hampered by basic problems, even 
apart from the administrative and technical problems o f "integration". 




























































































to identify with a supposed entity the boundaries o f which are so 
unclear. If Europe is confined to the European Community, these 
boundaries seem arbitrary, as the similarities between e.g. Denmark 
(part o f the EC) and Norway (outside the EC) are much greater than 
between Denmark and, say, Greece. Moreover, for the European 
Community the image o f a territorial unit - which has been and still 
is highly important in enhancing feelings o f national identity - can be 
held up only with the greatest difficulty, as its geographical shape is 
one o f confusing irregularity, looking more like a feudal assemblage 
o f lands than one large country.
Another hindrance to the formation of a common "European 
identity" is, o f course, Europe’s diversity. This could be overcome in 
the long run - as it has been overcome to a large extent on the 
national scale -, if this diversity were not organized politically in 
strong national states, each with its own administrative centre, its 
own capital, its own standardized language, its own universities, 
educational system, and mass media. None of these states dominates 
the other ones; within Europe, however defined, there is not one 
centre from which one core culture flows to less powerful and more 
peripheral groups, as e.g. the Parisian court circles once set the 
standards for what became the French language and French culture 
in general.
The drift toward diversity within the European Community (to 
confine ourselves only to that part of Europe) is enhanced by the 
strong bonds several of the member states have with other states 
outside the Community. In Britain there is a strong orientation to 




























































































speaking world; Britain may be regarded as part o f a wider 
Anglosaxon culture whose point of gravity has shifted towards the 
United States. The Danes define themselves as belonging to 
Scandinavia, the largest part o f which is outside the European 
Community. Among some groups o f Germans there is a renewed 
orientation to Mitteleuropa. Central Europe which not only includes 
Eastern Germany but also the nations o f the former Austrian- 
Hungarian empire. Spain and Portugal, finally, have strong cultural 
connections with their former colonies in Latin America.
All these features o f present-day Europe make it highly unlikely that 
ideas and feelings o f a common European identity will develop on a 
scale and with an intensity comparable to the development o f ideas 
and feelings of national identity. Yet it would be too easy to conclude 
the other extreme: that "European identity" means nothing at all, that 
it is merely an empty phrase used by Eurobureaucrats for 
propaganda. This investigation indicates that the idea o f a European 
identity is taken seriously not only by those who have direct 
professional interests in propagating European integration, but also 
by people who do not have such interests. With the growing scale o f 
economic competition in the world it is to be expected that powerful 
European business interests will increasingly seek political as well as 
cultural allies in the formation o f one European market. Interlinking 
economic, political and cultural elite groups will give meaning to the 






























































































Given the wide range of topics dealt with in this paper, in this 
concluding section I can do no more than summarize briefly some 
o f the findings o f this case-study and add a few remarks on their 
wider implications.
The case studied here represents a type o f social figuration which 
is becoming more common in the world today: a figuration in which 
people from different nations, with different nation-bound cultures 
(including language, behavioural norms, and everyday knowledge), 
have to cooperate on an more or less permanent basis. With the 
growth and increasing importance o f international organisations - 
including multinational corporations and huge public bureaucracies 
like those o f the European Community and the United Nations - 
growing numbers o f people are placed in such situations. They may 
be attracted by material and related status rewards (good salaries and 
career prospects) but also - as was found in this investigation - by the 
excitement and learning experiences associated with participation in 
an international setting.
However, these same people also encounter problems related to 
their position. As foreigners they have to adapt to the society they 
have come to live in. When they stay there for a long time, they may 
become more and more estranged from their country o f origin 
without feeling really at home in their new environment; in other 
words, they may experience feelings o f disorientation and 
marginalization. Such feelings were indeed reported by some (not 





























































































A  second type o f problem pertains to the organisation itself: 
problems o f communication, o f misunderstanding, o f tensions and 
conflicts between members o f the organisation belonging to different 
nations. These problems can be mitigated by shared cultural traits and 
a common identity cross-cutting the national differences. Problems of 
this nature and counter mechanisms could be observed in this case. 
While there were recurring problems o f (mis)communication which 
had to do with the international character o f the organisation, its 
members also shared cultural traits which were not nation-bound; not 
only did they come from the same type o f Western national societies, 
most o f them also shared more specific orientations as middle-class 
intellectuals oriented to an academic career; and disciplinary groups 
among them participated in common scientific and scholarly 
subcultures (even though these were also characterized by national 
varieties). Moreover, a norm o f internationalism was adhered to, as 
could be inferred from expressed opinions: the norm that one should 
be open to foreign cultures, beware o f prejudices and parochialism, 
and get along well with people irrespective of their nationality. 
Finally, many members o f this European organisation (the majority 
o f the respondents) defined themselves as having a shared European 
identity; they tended to define Europe as part o f the West which was 
distinguished from other parts - in particular the United States o f 
America - by a common culture and history.
Yet in spite o f these shared cultural traits, the norm of 
internationalism and common feelings o f identification with Europe, 




























































































organisation, as they were expressed by both people’s self-definitions 
and their definitions o f others. Respondents readily acknowledged the 
distinctiveness o f their own nation compared to other ones - in terms 
of cultural traditions and even personality traits. Moreover, their 
national consciousness tended to increase through their experiences 
in the organisation. That is, they tended to develop clearer and 
stronger ideas about the distinctiveness of their own nation (according 
to their own self-report) as well as the distinctiveness of other 
nations. However, this did not always go together with a strong and 
increasing positive emotional identification with one’s country. In 
matters o f national pride and protection o f national interests most 
respondents were not very outspoken.
The importance of national differences was not only shown by 
verbal statements; it also appeared in patterns of informal interaction. 
While the norm o f internationalism apparently precluded a clear 
expression o f preferences for friendly relations with compatriots, self- 
reports on actual relations showed that informal interactions with 
compatriots were relatively frequent. Besides, both respondents’ stated 
preferences and their reports on actual interactions showed a liking 
for members o f specific nations; in particular, people from Southern 
European (Mediterranean, Latin) countries tended to prefer the 
company o f people from other Southern countries, whereas Northern 
Europeans showed some more preference for interaction with 
noncompatriots from their own part of Europe. In other words, the 
establishment o f informal relations and networks was partially 
determined by nationality, or, more specifically, by degrees o f nation- 




























































































Interaction preferences were related, to some extent, to the 
attribution o f different personality traits to different nations. The 
participants in this international setting perceived cultural and 
psychological differences not only between their own and other 
nations, but also between various other nations than their own. 
Although they often showed a dislike of crude stereotypes, they 
tended to generalize about nations in psychological and moral terms. 
In other words, they held certain, more or less well-defined, images 
o f national character. Their descriptions of the characteristics o f five 
Western European nations - France, England, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands - showed many variations and subtle shades o f meaning; 
yet for each nation specific central tendencies in the descriptions were 
found, which largely conformed to widespread, fairly popular national 
images. This does not mean that the respondents’ descriptions 
reflected a blind conformity to conventional stereotypes; it rather 
means that they were inclined to interpret, order, and verbalize their 
experiences with and information about members o f the five nations 
(particularly their interaction experiences in the organisation) in terms 
o f the concepts and social knowledge they already had. The high 
degree o f correspondence between the respondents’ descriptions and 
popular images may indicate both selective perception (the tendency 
to see and to stress empirical phenomena that confirm existing ideas) 
and selective verbalization (i.e. difficulties in verbalizing complex 
social knowledge in other than conventional terms).
Theoretically, the correspondence between respondents’ 
descriptions and popular images might also be explained as being 




























































































interpretation would be far too simple, the images are not unrelated 
to the reality to which they refer; as has been shown here, there are 
indeed connections between popular images o f national character 
reflected by the respondents’ descriptions and distinctive aspects of 
national histories and cultures. At the same time, these images are at 
best only crude generalisations, and therefore simplifications, o f real 
national characteristics. Moreover, the images expressed by the 
respondents reflect tendencies o f psychologizing (the interpretation of 
sociocultural phenomena in psychological terms) and moralizing (the 
interpretation of these phenomena in terms of good or bad, 
favourable or unfavourable, desirable or undesirable). Therefore, it is 
hardly possible to test scientifically the extent to which these sketches 
o f national character are true or false, as they only partially refer to 
observable behaviour and are highly interpretative and value-laden. 
This is typical for everyday social knowledge; people in everyday 
social life are not so much interested in other people’s "objective" 
characteristics as in the ways they may get along with them, - if they 
are pleasant or not, cooperative or uncooperative, reliable or 
unreliable, potential friends or potential ennemies. The formation of 
such attributions is not only determined by direct observations but 
also by hearsay, speculation, and positive and negative emotions. This 
is a fortiori true with respect to the attribution o f traits to 
collectivities such as nations. The formation o f images o f national 
character is comparable, in important respects, to the formation o f 
images o f individual character; both are determined by similar 
processes and rooted in everyday life experiences. The ways people 




























































































to the level o f (national and other) collectivities. On both levels, 
descriptions do not only reflect qualities o f the described, but also 
emotional attitudes o f those who describe.
One motivational source for the formation o f images o f national 
character may be nationalism in the widest sense; or, in even broader 
terms, the need for positive we-feelings, the need for self-respect 
sustained by identification with a collectivity. To the extent that 
images o f national character are based on nationalism in this broad 
sense, we may expect that they differentiate between the respondents’ 
own nation and other nations in terms o f positive values. While such 
a differentiation has been found in several surveys on national 
stereotypes, it was virtually absent among the respondents in this 
study. Though most o f them did not deny having some sentiments of 
national pride, they tended to express them in very moderate terms; 
and, correspondingly, their descriptions o f the characteristics o f their 
own nation were on the whole not strikingly more favourable than 
those o f other nations. This is, o f course, related to the 
internationalism and the positive identification with the larger unit of 
"Europe" prevailing in this group. By being internationally oriented 
and Europe-minded feelings o f national pride and antagonism were 
mitigated.
While this is typical for the group investigated here (their 
expressed national pride was relatively weak and their identification 
with Europe relatively strong compared to the populations o f the 
involved European nations at large), it may also be regarded as 
indicative for a sociocultural trend in Western Europe since the 




























































































slow and hesitating emergence o f feelings o f identification with 
Europe as an economic, political, and cultural unit. We may expect 
that in this sense the attitudes shown by this group will become more 




























































































1) The concept o f "nation" is by no means the only one which has 
this self-referential character. Many, if not most concepts referring 
to social "reality" also refer to the reality definitions o f those who 
constitute that reality.
2) The questionnaire was distributed among more than 400 
members o f the organisation, which means that the non-response 
was more than 75%. Therefore, the quantitative results cannot be 
regarded as reflecting the distribution o f ideas and opinions among 
"the" members o f the organisation. Non-response was particularly 
large among members o f the administrative staff; this may be 
related to the fact that many members o f the administrative staff 
were Italian residents and a) did not understand English very well 
(the questionnaire was in English, though it could be answered in 
French, German, Italian, or Dutch as well), b) had a marginal 
position in the organisation. Response was much higher among the 
students and researchers, who together formed the large majority 
o f the respondents (81%). For the purposes o f this investigation 
these were the most relevant groups. As this is an explorative 
case-study without a clearly defined "population", the problem o f 
representativeness was not acute. There may be, nevertheless, a 
selective bias in favour o f those who were particularly interested in 
problems o f national identity, which may have influenced in the 
results. This presumption was not confirmed, however, by the long 
interviews and informal talks I had with several non-respondents
to the questionnaire: they seemed to be just as interested in 
problems o f national identity as respondents seemed to be. As the 
main reasons for not answering the questionnaire they gave lack 
o f time and the difficulty o f answering several o f the open-ended 
questions.
3) This is exemplified by the recent Historikerstreit in Western 
Germany, the public debate among historians and other 





























































































4) This refers to 1987.
5) Thus, they were defined as relatively immodest and self- 
confident by the respondents in Peabody (1985). The differences 
with the defintions o f the English and the Germans in these 
respects were only small, however.
6) See e.g. L’Europe et ses populations (1978): 299-306.
7) Peabody (1985) found that his respondents defined the English 
as relatively calm and cautious.
8) Gorer (1955) found that many of his respondents (a non­
representative sample o f English men and women) said that 
shyness was or had been a problem for them.
9) In Peabody’s investigation (1985) the Germans received 
relatively high scores on items like serious, grim, severe, persistent, 
inflexible, and hard-working. To give quite another example: in a 
recent article in Zeit Magazin (28 April 1989) about "the typical 
German?" the following traits (among other ones) were mentioned 
as being contained in common ideas: industrious, correct, order- 
loving (ordentlich), perfectionist.
10) Thus, rechthaberisch (pedantic, convinced o f never being 
wrong) was mentioned in Zeit Magazin as a common idea about 
the Germans.
11) By Montesquieu, among others; cf. Bourdieu (1980).
12) As documented by Schama (1987) for the seventeenth century.
13) One indication for this moralistic or ethical progressivism is 
the relative large support among the Dutch population for 
government-sponsored foreign aid to poor countries. See Inkeles 





























































































14) We may refer here to what psychologists have called "the 
fundamental attribution error", i.e. the "tendency to account for 
others’ actions in terms of dispositional rather than situational 
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QUESTIONNAIRE DATA N = 100
Answer seiow
1/ Hnat is your nationality (according to your passoort/?
2) To which nation -or nations- do you feel you oeiona?
(NB: The answer to this Question may oe the same as to 
the first, but not necessarily.
NB: If you feel you belong to more than one nation, piease 
indicate which is the aost laoortant for you, and answer the 
following Questions accordingly.)
3) Can you subscribe to the following statements? Piease out a circie around the
corresponding number:
0. not suoscripe at an
1. suoscripe somewhat
2. supscripe to a 1arge extent
0. tui ly subscribe
n.a. total
- The nation I oeiona to means a lot to me 0 2 3
33 31 19 5 100
- I am proud to be from ............. . 0 1 3
(fill in the nation vou feel vou belong to) 29 37 10 16 8 100
- Nv nation is characterized by certain distinct traditions.
1 19 36 43 1 100
- It is desiraole that these traditions be maintained 0 3
13 43 24 9 11 100
- The people of my country nave certain personality traits
which are, on the whole, different from those of people 
from other countries. 0 1 2 3
37 32 22 2 100
- It is desirable that these oersonaiitv traits be naintained. 0 1 3
25 50 13 8 ♦ 100
- In aeneral, I feel proud when compatriots of sine achieve
something which is recognized internationally as being 
important 0 1 3
29 j3 20 15 100
- In general, I feel ashamed when compatriots ac certain things
which are frowned upon oy foreigners. 0 i 2 3
22 33 2c 17 2 100
- I feel rather indifferent toward what other people think
about people from ay country. o i 2 3




























































































4/ Can you sav something about the nature of the distinct 
characteristics (traditions, personality traits/ of vour 
nation? Please specify your answer as fuiiv as possible.
5) In the following itess you are asked to mention personality 
of mentality traits wnich, according to you, can be found sore 
often among the people of a certain country in Western Europe than 
among the people of other Western European countries. Of course, 
this is not a test of your knowledge of the different Western 
European nations; You are merely asked to give your personal 
impressions. You mav mention as many characteristics as vou think 
are significant.
- Compared to the people of other Western European countries, the 
French are, on the whole.....................................
nationalistic, chauvinistic etc. 
arrogant, proud etc. 
refined etc.
individualistic, self-centerea etc. 
charming, vivacious etc. 
distant, closed, cold etc. 
rational, intelligent etc.
- Compared to the people of otner Western European countries, 
the English are, on the whole, ...................... .
reserved, closed, etc. 
nationalistic, isolationist etc. 
friendly etc. 
arrogant, oroud etc. 
conservative etc. 
humorous, etc.
- Compared to the people of otner Western European countries,
the Italians are, on the whole, .........................  lively, spontaneous, extravert etc.
egoistic, self-centered etc. 
undisciplined etc. 
chearful, joyous, optimistic etc. 
family spirit, group spirit etc. 
refined, artistic etc. 
image-conscious, theatrical etc.
- Compared to the people of Western European countries,
the Dutch are, on the whole........................  friendly etc.
internationalist, cosmopolitan etc. 
serious, reserved, boring etc. 
progressive, liberal, tolerant etc. 
frugal, sober, meoatetc. 






























































































- Cospared to the people of other Western European countries, 
the Seraans are, on the whole, . ........................ orderly, disciplined, foriaai etc. 
serious, dull etc. 
hard-working, aabitious etc. 
arrogant etc. 









6) Can you indicate if and in what direction your ideas about tne 
following matters have changed since you have come to the 
European University Institute?
Since I have cone to the European University Instiute,
- ay ideas about the cultural and psychological differences 
between nations have becose less clear/dearer
- I have found that these differences are less/sore uportant 
than I first thought
- The distinctiveness of my own nation seess to me less/more 
narked now
- Hy preferences for certain countries cosoared to others 
have becose i ess strong/stronger
- fly feelings of identification with ay own country nave 
becose less strong/stronger
- I have become less/sore convinced that Europeans have 
something in common
Please Dut a circle arouna the corresponding number
- 2.' much less
- 1: somewhat less
- 0: remained tne same 
+ 1: somewhat more
+ 2; much more
n.a. total
-2 -1 0 +1 *2
0 6 26 44 21 7 100
-2 1 0 ♦ 1 ♦2
0 17 41 24 9 3 100
-2 J 0 ♦ 1 +2
4 ? 41 24 18 4 100
_2 1 0 ♦1 +2
4 37 33 11 8 100
- l 0 ♦ 1 +2
5 16 48 18 7 6 100
-2 t 0 +1 +2
3 e
7C 29 17 8 100
Do you agree with the statement: “We, Europeans, have a common 1. stronglv agree 18
identity which distinguishes us from people from other parts 2. agree to some extent 47
of the world8 (Put a circle around the corresponding number.) 7 neither agree nor disagree 12
4. disagree to some extent 10
5. strongly disagree 7
n.a. à
total 100
If you agree with this statement, could you indicate in 













































































































Mould you define yourself as "European"? 1. yes, definitely
2. to some extent
3. no
4. don^t know/'n.a.
If you had to choose, in defining yourself, between 1. European
"European" and the nation you belong to, what would you 2. nation I belong to
choose? 7 don't know/n.a.
In your work at the European University Institute, have 1. yes
you experienced specific problems arising from the fact 2. no
that people from different countries are working together? n. a.
(N.B. "work" includes here all the activities that are 
directly related to your position in the EUI, e.g. 
administration, teaching, research, studying, following 
seminars.)
If "yes”: Can you say something about the nature of these problems?
On the whole, do you like or dislike working with people ftt® 
other countries than your own?
1. like it
2. neither like nor dislike it
3. dislike it 
n.a.
Could you give one or more reasons for your preference?
1. strong preference
2. moderate preference
3. no such preference 
n.a.
(If possible, specify your order of preference.)
Can you give one or sore reasons for your preference?
Considering your informal (non-work) contacts and friendly 
relations with oeoole related to the Institute, do you have 
a preference for people from a certain country or countries? 
(N.B.| This may be your own country.)




























































































12) Please lention the nationality and the sex of the five
persons related to the EUI with whom you have most contacts 
outside of your work.
nationality sex (fl or F)
13) When you consider the last two times you had dinner
with personsjfroi your family {or partner), can vou »• j-wc: 
mention the nationality and the sex of these persons, 
and also whether they are related to the EUI?
(a maximum of 5 persons.)
nationality sex iH or Fi related to EUI
4
5
14) Please give somt information about yourself.
Since when have you had a position at the EUI?
Ses: )1 i t  14 = 73; F = 26:




5 50 or older 5
funct:ion: 1 student-researcher 57
2 research assistant 7
3 Jean Sonnet fsi low > 7
4 professor 5
5 member of admini-
strative staff 13
































































































Which languages do you speak7 Please Dut a cross according 
to your self-evaluation.
Fleuently Very well Fairly well
English 59 21 16
French 29 21 22
Italian 29 13 27
Sernan 26 10 20
other, naaely .............. ......... 39 "> 5
other, naaeiv................... . L 7 4
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